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ABSTRACT

The Authors introduce and critique Japan's proposed
The
quasi-jury or lay assessor system (saiban-in seido).
deciding
judges
and
lay
people
will
have
proposed mixed-court
together both guilt and sentences in serious criminal cases. Its
proponents have promised that the lay assessor system will
produce better justice in the courts and a more democratic
society for Japan. The Authors first expose the competing
interests in the lay assessor drafting process, examining their
subtly but importantly varied proposals. Second, the Authors
historically review lay participationin Japan, arguing that it
has failed to deliver better justice and more democracy because
the existing systems have been marginalized by disuse or
captured by law specialists. Third, the Authors consider the
proposal in light of international psychology research
suggesting that early criticism of the system may be
circumspect. The Authors conclude with cautious optimism
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Japanese at, Kent Anderson, Gaikoku no jCshiki kara mita saiban-in seido [The lay
assessor system viewed from a foreign commonsense perspective], 940 HORITSU JIHM 37
(Feb. 2004). We wish to thank a number of people who gave advice and help, including
Keisuke Hosoda, Makoto Ibusuki, Masahito Inouye, David Johnson, Hugh Selby,
Susumu Takami, Fumio Tokotani, Mark West, and conference participants at the
Japanese Studies Association Australia, Osaka University School of International and
Public Policy, and Chuo University Law School. All of the usual rules apply: We made
and accept the responsibility for all mistakes; unless otherwise indicated, translations
are our own; and to the extent possible we have cited to English-language sources.
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regarding the potential of the new Japanese system and a call
for more research to fine-tune the proposal and rightfully
introduce it as a comparative global model.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In the early 1990s, filmmaker Shun Nakahara sat thinking
about his next movie. He wanted to make a farcical comedy. He
remembered watching the great American classic by Sidney Lumet,
Twelve Angry Men (1957) starring Henry Fonda, while he was a
student at Tokyo University. What if he took that premise-the
solemnity of twelve people sitting in a jury room and deciding the fate
of one of their peers-and set it in Japan? Indeed, nothing could be
more preposterous than twelve Japanese citizens deciding the fate of
one of their peers. Japanese are too emotional, non-committal, nonconfrontational, and hierarchically bound to be able to judge a fellow,
he thought. The result of Nakahara's flash was the movie Twelve
Kind Japanese (12nin yasashii nippon-jin) (1991). 1 The movie is
played for laughs, and in it every stereotype of Japan's modern milieu
is on display, including the salary man (business person), shufu
(housewife), chinpira (small-time hoodlum), r6d~sha (labourer), r6jin
(senior citizen), k6muin (civil servant), freeta (young, under-employed
person), interi (sophisticate), and so forth. Yet, in the end, the film,
without trying to do so, seems to disprove the idea that Japanese are
incapable of rational and independent decision-making. In fact, the
verdict that the movie's jury arrives at and the deliberation the jury
goes through in coming to its decision is exactly what those interested
in the jury system's justice and democratic ideals would hope to see.
Nakahara's premise was not as bizarre as perhaps he thought.
Japan had a jury system between 1923 and 1943 and continues to

1.
See Internet Movie Database, JUNININ YASHASHII NIHONJIN (1991), at
http://us.imdb.com/title/ttOlO4330 (last visited Oct. 1, 2003).
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have a number of roles for "lay participants" 2 in today's justice
system. 3 Furthermore, just ten years after Nakahara's film, the
Prime Minister's blue-ribbon commission on judicial reform has4
effectively mandated the introduction of a new jury-like scheme.
This Article examines that scheme, known in Japanese as the saibanin seido and in English as the "lay assessor system" or "mixed-court."
This article seeks to accomplish a number of goals. One purpose
is to inform. In contrast to many of Japan's other current judicial
reforms such as increasing the size of the bar and changing the
format of legal education, 5 Japan's introduction of the lay assessor
system is still relatively unknown in both the English and Japanese
literature. Further, the details of the planned system are only now
being debated and resolved. Second, this Article explains and
critiques the present efforts in light of Japan's historical participation
schemes. Past efforts have in practice been marginalized and
captured so that they do not achieve the justice and democratic aims
sought by the drafters of the lay assessor system. Third, international
empirical psychological research is used to demonstrate why ground
for optimism exists regarding the proposed lay assessor system.
Finally, we conclude by shifting the focus briefly to examine what
Japan's lay assessor system might mean to countries other than
Japan.
Part II of this Article examines the background of the judicial
reform movement of the late 1990s. In particular, it identifies and
examines the rationale upon which the call for the lay assessor
system has been based. Part III sets out in detail the most recent
concrete proposal for the lay assessor system and pays specific
attention to suggested alternative options. In doing so, the likely
consequences of the design are suggested. Part IV uses domestic
historical data to show why previous lay participation systems in
Japan have failed to deliver the objectives identified in Part II. Those
lessons are then used as a standard by which to test the lay assessor

2.
At the outset, we clarify our general usage of terms, which is apologetically
but necessarily nuanced. "Lay participant" (shiho seido ni sanka suru ippan no
kokumin) refers to general citizens without a legal background who participate in the
judicial process.
3.
"Lawyer" (heritsusenmon ka) is used broadly in the British sense to mean
any person with a general legal background. "Member of the bar" (h6s6kai) is used to
refer to any person who has passed the entrance exam to the Legal and Training
Research Institute, including judges, prosecutors, and private barristers. "Barrister"
(bengoshi) is used to refer to members of the bar who are in private practice.
4.
See JRC Report, infra note 7, at ch IV, pt. 1(1).

5.

See, e.g., Gerald Paul McAlinn, Reforming the System of Legal Education:A

Call for Bold Leadership and Self-Governance, 2 ASIAN-PAc. L. & POL'Y J. 15 (2001);
Dan Rosen, Schooling Lawyers, 2 ASiAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 17 (2001); Yukio Yanagida,

A New Paradigm for Japanese Legal Training and Education-In Light of the Legal
Education at Harvard Law School, 1 ASIAN-PAc. L. & POLY J. 1 (2000).
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proposal. Based on historical data, this Article argues that for the
proposed system to achieve the sought-after objectives, it must rely
upon the affirmative support of the prosecutor's office, the judiciary,
and the government. In Part V, international psychological data is
used to focus on the three primary unresolved issues for the lay
assessor system: (1) the mixed court's composition, (2) its voting
rules, and (3) the relationship between lay and expert factions of the
court. From this alternative perspective, whether the proposed lay
assessor system will deliver the desired objectives is considered and
the Article comes to an optimistic conclusion regarding the
psychological issues involved. The Article closes by considering briefly
what Japan's lay assessor system might suggest for legal systems
outside of Japan.

II.

BACKGROUND TO AND RATIONALE FOR THE LAY ASSESSOR SYSTEM

A. Background of the Lay Assessor System within Japan'sJudicial
Reform Movement
The introduction of a jury system, or more accurately the revival
of Japan's suspended jury system, is not a new proposal. In fact,
every few years since the end of the World War II some scholar or
group has made the proposal in various forms. 6 These proposals,
however, had not been taken seriously until the "serendipity of
events" that led to the development of the Judicial Reform Council
(JRC or shih6 seido kaikaku shingikai) in June 1999. 7 In June 2001,

6.

See, e.g., Lester W. Kiss, Reviving the CriminalJury in Japan, 62 LAW &

CONTEMP. PROBS. 261, 262-66 (1999) (noting various attempts and studies regarding
reintroducing the jury or lay assessor system); Joseph J. Kodner, Re-Introducing Lay

Participationto Japanese Criminal Cases: An Awkward Yet Necessary Step, 2 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 231, 231 (2003); Richard Lempert, A Jury for Japan, 40 AM. J.
COMP. L. 37, 38-39 (1992) [hereinafter Lempert, Jury] (noting various attempts and
studies regarding reintroducing the jury or lay assessor system); Richard Lempert,

Citizen Participationin Judicial Decision Making: Juries, Lay Judges and Japan,2002
ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 1, 13 n.44 (2002) [hereinafter Lempert,
Citizens Participation](providing a proposal for how Japan might introduce a jury).
Any internet search for "baishin" ["jury'l will identify numerous grassroots
organizations in Japan supporting revival of the jury system. See, e.g., Baishin saiban

seido wo kangaete mimasenka [Won't you give a thought to the jury trial system], at
http://homepage2.nifty.com/saitama-jury (last visited Oct. 1 2003); Baishin saiban wo
kangaeru kai [Committee to consider jury trials], at http://baishin.houmu.org (last
visited Oct. 1, 2003); Baishin seido wo fukkatsu suru kai [Committee for the revival of
the jury system], at http://www.l-wise.co.jp/baishin (last visited Oct. 1, 2003).
7.
What exactly were the political influences and objectives that combined to
result in the judicial reform movement during the late 1990s and early 2000s is a
highly debated and speculative area. See, e.g., Shih6 seido kaikaku shingikai secchi h6
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when the JRC issued its report, which was adopted by Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi's Cabinet, the new lay assessor system suddenly
8
appeared to be a foregone outcome of the process.
The actual implementation of the JRC's recommendations was
left to the newly formed Office for Promotion of Justice System
Reform (Reform Office or shihd seido kaikaku suishin honbu).9 The
Reform Office is charged with implementing all of the general
proposals of the JRC Report by December 2004, including the changes
to admission for legal practice, legal education, and the lay assessor
system. To execute its duty, the Reform Office has subdivided this
work into ten categories.' 0
Responsibility for the lay assessor system was delegated to the
Lay Assessor/Penal Matters Study Investigation Committee
(Investigation Committee or saiban-in keiji kent6kai) chaired by
Tokyo University Professor Masahito Inouye." On March 11, 2003,
the Investigation Committee presented its initial discussion paper on
the lay assessor system. This discussion paper is a primary focus of
this article. 12 The March 11, 2003 draft was supplemented by
provisions suggested by Professor Inouye in his personal capacity on
October 28, 2003 while the Diet was dissolved for elections. 13
Professor Inouye's revisions appear to be the frontrunners for
adoption because his is the most recent draft and his opinions
generally take a middle ground. However, in this Article, revisions

[Act for the establishment of the Judicial Reform Council], Law No. 68 of 1999,
available at http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi. Providing perhaps the most
lucid account in Japanese and English are the various writings of Professor Setsuo
Miyazawa, a leading figure in the reform movement. See, e.g., Setsuo Miyazawa, The
Politics of JudicialReform in Japan: The Rule of Law at Last?, 2 ASIAN-PAc. L. & POLY
J. 89, 106-10 (2001).
8.
See Judicial System Reform Council, Recommendations of the Justice
System Reform Council For a Justice System to Support Japan in the 21st Century,
ch. IV, pt. 1(1), at 80-83 (June 12, 2001), at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/
judiciary/2001/0612report.html [hereinafter JRC Report].
9.
See Shih5 seido kaikaku suishin ho [Justice system reform promotion act],
Law No. 119 of 2001, arts. 8-18, available at http:/l/aw/e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi.
10.
Reform Office, Kent6-kai no kaisai ni tsuite [Regarding Formation of the
Investigation Committees] (Dec. 17. 2001), at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/
kentoukai/kaisai.html.
11.
Investigation Committee, Minutes to First Meeting (Feb. 28, 2002), at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singisihoulkentoukai/saibanin/dail/lgijiroku.html.
12.
Investigation Committee, Saibanin seido ni tsuite [Concerning the Lay
Assessor System] (Mar. 11, 2003), at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/
saibaninldail3/13siryoul.pdf [hereinafter Lay Assessor Proposal].
13.
Chairperson Masahito Inouye, Kangaerareru saibanin seido no gaiy6
nitsuite [Concerning the Lay Assessor System Outline Under Consideration] (Oct. 28,
2003), at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singilsihoulkentoukailsaibanin/dai28/28siryoul.pdf
[hereinafter Inouye Addendum].
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are treated as further alternatives to those proposed in the first draft
because they are still pending Parliamentary approval.
B. Rationale for Lay Participationin the JudicialSystem
To assess critically the Investigation Committee's proposal and
the lay assessor system in general, it is essential to identify what
Koizumi's Cabinet, the JRC, and the reform advocates sought to
achieve by increasing lay participation in the Japanese judicial
system. In short, what is the rationale for the lay assessor system in
Japan? Answering this question is necessarily difficult because a
variety of supporters and critics have asserted contradictory,
overlapping, and redundant objectives. Furthermore, the discussion
regarding the lay assessor system has taken place within a larger
debate about judicial reform in general. Nevertheless, in this section
the core principles that proponents both inside and outside of Japan
have given for having or increasing lay participation in a legal system
are identified. This analysis is limited to direct benefits; the Article
does not attempt to identify and classify the political motivations or
the rationale that created the "serendipity of events" that made the
lay assessor proposal viable.
Most of the classical reasons given outside of Japan in defence of
the jury system have been reflected in the judicial reform debate.
Some commentators assert that the purpose of increasing citizen
participation is particularly necessary in Japan given its
comparatively high criminal conviction rate and currently low level of
citizen involvement with the legal system. 14 These Japan-specific
motives, however, do not include promotion of defendants' rights,
which the JRC has expressly excluded as a rationale for reform. 15
Considering both the general and specific claims, the arguments in
favor of lay participation can be categorized into three types of
arguments. These categories are (1) production of better justice, (2)
promotion of a more democratic society, and (3) miscellaneous other
reasons.
1. Delivering Better Justice
Perhaps the most cogent reason for lay participation in judicial
matters is the belief that it will produce better justice. 16 There are
two intertwined threads to this argument. First is the notion that
laypeople have a wide range of practical experiences and background

14.
15.
16.

See sources cited supra note 5.
JRC Report, supra note 7, at ch. IV, pt. 1(4), at 84-85.
See, e.g., Lempert, Jury, supranote 5, at 49-52.
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and, therefore, are best placed to understand and appreciate a
defendant's criminality and the appropriate response. 17 The second
thread is that professional judges are less capable decision makers in
certain situations because they hold narrower life experiences, are
disconnected from popular society, over-represent certain segments of
society, and either have or develop an institutional bias in favor of the
prosecution or the state.
These claims are not unique to Japan.1 8 Nonetheless, some of
them, especially with regard to judges, have particular resonance
within Japan. For example, because of the historical difficulty in
passing the Japanese bar exam, upon entry into the profession
Japanese judges are better educated, come from richer families, and
are likely to have had more limited life experiences than their nonlawyer peers. 19 Further, because the Japanese judiciary is a lifelong
profession modeled on the Continental system, judges do not gain a
variety of experiences once they become legal professionals but
instead immediately begin doing what they will do for the rest of
their careers. 20 Japanese judicial culture also takes very seriously the
ideal of absolute impartiality and this results in judges isolating
themselves from greater society. 21 This effect is exacerbated by the
bureaucratic management of judges' careers in Japan, which requires
constant rotation throughout the country. 22 This lifestyle results in
the isolation of judges and their families in judge-only housing
residences, which thereby strengthens collegial bonds but weakens
any ties with the public.
All of these influences are the backdrop to a criminal justice
system that results in convictions in nearly every case. 23 In other

17.
Kojima Akira, Open Society through Justice System Reform, 21 J. TRADE &
INDUSTRY 33, 36 (2002) ("[The lack of lay participants in the judicial system] makes the
justice system only remotely connected to the general public and prevents sound social
commonsense being reflected in court proceedings.").
18.
For example, though writing about the democratic aspects of the jury
system in the United States, Abramson recognizes the quality-of-justice point: "The
whole point [of lay participation] is to subject law to a democratic interpretation, to
achieve a justice that resonates with the values and common sense of the people in
whose name the law was written." JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY
SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 6 (1994).

19.

See John Haley, Judicial Independence in Japan Revisited, 25 LAW IN

JAPAN 1, 16-18 (1995).

20.
Id. at 10-16; YASUO WATANABE ET AL., GENDAI SHIHO [MODERN JUDICIAL
SYSTEM] 105-08 (4th ed. 2000).
21.
See, e.g., WATANABE ET AL., supra note 19, at 105-08; Kazuhiro Yonemoto,
The Shimane Bar Association:All Twenty-One Members Strong, 25 LAW IN JAPAN 115,
117 (1995) (Daniel H. Foote trans.).
22.
See Setsuo Miyazawa, Administrative Control of Japanese Judges, in LAW
& TECHNOLOGY IN THE PACIFIC COMMUNITY 263 (Philip S.C. Lewis ed., 1991).

23.
As David Johnson points out, comparing similar cases results in less than
the widely cited 99.9 percent conviction rate for Japan, but even the most generous

20041

LAY PARTICIPATION IN THEJAPANESEJUSTICESYSTEM

943

words, critics of the present system often argue that accompanying
Japanese judges' disconnection and isolation from general society
(which is cynically described as their lack of "commonsense" (joshiki))
is the fact that the judiciary is partial towards the police and
prosecution. It is still highly debated whether this bias derives from
latent personality characteristics of the elites who self-select into the
profession, social and cultural assimilation within the judicial
bureaucracy, or political recruitment and opportunism. 24 Whatever
the cause of the documented judicial predisposition, it is believed that
laypeople who do not have the same elite background, who are not
subject to pressures to assimilate, and who have no personal political
stake in court proceedings will be less constrained in making judicial
decisions against the police and prosecutors. Thus, with
implementation of a lay assessor system, the quality of Japanese
justice will improve by tempering any narrow focus or bias of the
elites with a popular perspective and common sense.
2. Promoting a More Democratic Society
The second reason cited for lay participation in a judicial system
is the belief that it promotes a more democratic society. 25 Again this
rationale intertwines two threads. First is the idea that if citizens are
called for duty, they will learn about and become interested in the
judicial system. In turn, with a more educated and involved public,
the norms and operations of the judicial system will be brought to the
attention of the citizens. This it is hoped will translate into a legal
system that will be viewed as responsive to and reflective of the needs
of general society. Simply stated, lay participation promotes
grassroots democratic involvement, albeit through conscription.
The second thread focuses on the jury, or in this case the mixed
court, as a political forum to voice consent or dissent with those
norms devised in other political forums such as Parliament. The JRC
and its supporters have emphasized this aspect of lay participation as
a stimulus for developing a greater democratic consciousness in the
general population. For example, the JRC Report comments:
[I]n Japanese society of the 21st century, it is incumbent on the people
to break out of the excessive dependency on the state that accompanies
the traditional consciousness of being governed objects, develop public

interpretation of the data results in the comparatively high rate of 96.6 percent. DAVID
T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING CRIME IN JAPAN 215-18

(2002).
24.

CompareMiyazawa, supra note 22, with Haley, supranote 19, and J. MARK

RAMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF JUDGING IN JAPAN (2003).

25.

For an in-depth examination of this idea, see ABRAMSON, supra note 18.
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consciousness within themselves, and become more actively involved in
26
public affairs.

This statement is consistent with earlier comments made by the
JRC's chairman, Professor Emeritus Kdji Sat6:
I think we have reached the situation where we have to rethink how
human beings should live, that is as "autonomous individuals". I feel
that the time has come to outgrow this society, which passively depends
on regulation from above, and to rebuild it from a self-reliant base. The
departure point is self-reliance based on the autonomous individual, so
27
we have to prepare a social structure that facilitates this.

Again, this rationale is not unique to Japan, 28 but as SatS's quote
suggests the supporters of this argument in the Japanese context
emphasize what they see as an excessive passivity unique to Japan.29
3. Other Claimed Benefits of Lay Participation
In addition to these classical rationales for lay participation in
judicial proceedings, Japanese proponents have offered some
additional, perhaps circumspect, reasons why a lay assessor system is
particularly important for Japan now. The first supplemental
motivation is the claim that adopting a lay assessor system is
somehow necessary for international competitiveness in the twentyfirst century. 30 The use by domestic reformers of arguments
concerning the need to conform to allegedly international standards
(kokusai hy6jun) and comply with foreign pressure (gaiatsu)has a
long history in Japan. 31 Therefore, playing this card in a Japanese
climate that is concerned about its apparently waning economic

26.
JRC Report, supra note 7, at ch. IV.
27.
Carol Lawson & Simon Thornley, Translation: "Perceptionsof the Current
State of the Japanese Legal System" Interview with K6ji Sat6, Chairman of Japan's
JudicialReform Council, 4 AUSTL. J. OF ASIAN L. 76, 80 (2002).
28.
See, e.g.,
Sherman J. Clark, The Courage of Our Convictions, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 2381 (1999) (arguing for reinforcement of the personal responsibility rationale for
juries in the United States).
29.
This idea of excessive passivity unique to Japan is consistent with the
concept of amae or "indulgent dependency," which has been debated extensively within
the social psychology literature. See, e.g., Y. Muramoto et al., Conceptual and
Empirical Analysis of "amae" Exploration into Japanese Psychosocial Space (3), Paper
Presented at the 43d Congress of the Japan Group Dynamic Association, Gakushuin
Univ. (Nov. 1995); Y. Muramoto et al., Indigenous Analysis of the Japanese Concept
"amae"(indulgent dependence): Motivational Factors of "amae," Paper Presented at the
13th Cong. of the International Association of Cross-Cultural Psychology, Bellingham,
USA (Aug. 3-8, 1996).
30.
JRC Report, supra note 7, at ch. IV; Lawson & Thornley, supra note 26, at
77-79.
31.
See, e.g., MIKISO HANE, MODERN JAPAN: A HISTORICAL SURVEY ch. 4 (2d ed.
1992) (discussing domestic reformers during the late-Tokugawa to early-Meji period
who came to power and mobilized the country by using the threat of foreign pressure).
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power is likely to be effective. However, as is discussed below, this
comparative argument is weak because Japan already has numerous
vehicles for lay participation in judicial proceedings. Furthermore, lay
assessor or jury systems are not universal in the global community,
and important differences exist between classic jury and lay assessor
systems that tend to be shaped by domestic history and contemporary
32
concerns.
The second miscellaneous argument made by the lay assessor
proponents is that adopting the lay assessor system will make trials
shorter and more efficient.3 3 Because there currently is no need for
the court system to accommodate people who have jobs and other
obligations elsewhere, Japanese court procedure, including what is
known as pre-trial procedure in common law jurisdictions, has
developed so that a trial progresses over a series of hearings
occurring approximately once a month. 34 Thus, Japanese trials
appear comparatively long and inefficient, particularly when
inaccurately contrasted with the post-jury empanelment phase of the
common law trial.3 5 Nevertheless, commentators all over the world
would agree that making trials shorter and more efficient is an
important and legitimate objective. Introducing legal novices to the
process, however, will not directly make trials quicker or more
efficient. In fact, the contrary result is more likely. 36 Stated
differently, if one of the objectives of the greater judicial reform
movement is to make the trial process shorter and more efficient-as
it clearly is-this can be achieved directly through other means.
Suggesting that the lay assessor system will accomplish this goal
obscures the issue. As such, the Investigation Committee's focus on
other methods for efficiency rationalization-in conjunction with the
committee's awareness that initially the new lay assessor proceeding
will be slow and cumbersome and its view that these costs must be
37
set against the higher order rationales-is more enlightened.

32.
33.

See WORLD JURY SYSTEMS (Neil Vidmar ed., 2000).
See Shingo Miyake, Judicial Reform Proponent Seeks Larger Role for

Citizens, NIKKEI WKLY., Mar. 31, 2003, available at 2003 WL 10474486.
34.
J. MARK RAMSEYER & MINORu NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC
APPROACH 139-41 (1999).
35.
See JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 14-15.

36.
Id.; John Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI.
L. REV. 823 (1985). Note also one of the reasons for suspending the jury trial discussed
below was that it consumed more time, money, and material resources. See infra note
122.
37.
See, e.g., Investigation Committee, Keiji saiban no jujitsu/jinsokuka ni
tsuite (sono 1) [Regarding the movement for expedience and meaningfulness to criminal
trials (Part 1)], § 1.1.(3) (May 30, 2003), at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/
kentoukai/saibaninidail9/19siryoul-1.pdf; Investigation Committee, Keiji saiban no
jujitsu/jinsokuka ni tsuite (sono 2) [Regarding the movement for expedience and
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4. Summary of Rationales for Lay Participation
Three broad rationales cut through the murkiness of conflicting
and overlapping claims about the need for more lay assessor
participation in the judicial process. First is the belief that involving
the general public will improve judicial decisions by incorporating
popular common sense and by insulating the process from career
judges' narrower institutional and operational focus. Second is the
hope that adopting a lay assessor system will promote a more
democratic society by engaging the public and providing an
alternative political forum. Third are the questionable claims that a
lay assessor system is somehow demanded internationally and that it
will produce quicker, more efficient trials. These objectives are used
as benchmarks for testing the proposed lay assessor model against
domestic historical and international psychological data in the
remainder of this Article.

III. THE PROPOSED LAY ASSESSOR SYSTEM
On March 11, 2003, the Promotion Office's Investigation
Committee introduced its discussion paper on the lay assessor
system. Although this paper is merely intended to be a sounding
board (tatakidai) to advance the debate, it appears clear that this
document is setting the agenda and largely foreshadows the bill that
is to be introduced in 2004.38 Exposing and examining the issues in
contention at this consensus-building stage presents the true political
interests at play in this debate and the political compromises that
will eventually emerge. 39 As others have documented, this is a
process that historically has been purposefully veiled in Japan to
preserve the illusion of harmony. 40 Thus, it is worth conducting a
detailed examination of the proposal and the options that it
incorporates. Nevertheless, analysis of these political factors is left
for a later time; instead, the focus here is on documenting the debate
and suggesting the legal implications of the various alternatives.

meaningfulness to criminal trials (Part 2)] (July 18, 2003), at http://www.kantei.go.jp/
jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/saibanin/dai22/22siryou2-2.pdf.
38.
See Gary Schaefer, Japan Unveils Proposalsfor First Experiment with Jury
System, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRE, Mar. 12, 2003.
39.
See Gregory Noble, Reform and Continuity in Japan's Shingikai
Deliberation Councils, in BEYOND JAPAN INC.: TRANSPARENCY AND REFORM IN

JAPANESE GOVERNANCE (Jennifer Amyx & Peter Drysdale eds., 2003).
40.
(1987).

FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN 213-14

20041

LA Y PAR TICIPATION IN THEJAPANESE JUSTICE SYSTEM

947

A. Type and Composition of Mixed Courts
As noted above, the JRC proposal made clear that the
Investigation Committee was to consider the mixed court rather than a
classical all-citizen jury mechanism. 41
Nonetheless, the exact
numerical composition of judges and citizens in the lay assessor system
has engendered some of the most vehement debate within the
Investigation Committee-even to the extent that it has at times
monopolized all discussion. 4 2 The proposal and Professor Inouye's
addendum add detail to the JRC's general direction by suggesting
three options for the composition of the mixed court.43 The first option
44
consists of three judges and either two or three lay assessors.
Considering the proposed majority voting rules discussed below, three
lay assessors acting by themselves might constitute a majority for some
decisions, although judges acting alone could constitute a majority if
the option with only two lay participants is selected. Perhaps not
surprisingly it is suggested that this latter option of having two lay
45
participants is supported by the judiciary and prosecutor's office.
The proposal also contains an alternative mixed court
composition of either one or two judges accompanied by nine or eleven
lay assessors. 46 Such a lay-dominated group is more similar to
common-law twelve-person juries than civil-law three-person mixed
courts. This proposal is supported by practicing lawyers through the
Japanese Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA or Nihon bengoshi
47
rengd kai, nichibenren).
A third proposal is contained in Professor Inouye's addendum.
That draft advocates three judges joined by four lay participants, and
48
it leaves open the option of five or six citizens in the alternative.
Pursuant to some variations of the majority voting rules reviewed
below, under this proposal the lay participants could unite to override
opposition by the professional judges, and the professional judges
would need support of some of the lay participants to constitute the

41.
JRC Report, supranote 7, at ch. IV,pt. 1.
42.
See, e.g., Investigation Committee, Gijiroku dai 13 kai [Minutes of 13th
meeting] (Mar. 11, 2003), at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/saibanin/
dail3/13gijiroku.html [hereinafter Minutes 13th Meeting].
43.
In addition, the Investigation Committee's proposal recognized the
practical need for calling and empanelling supplemental or reserve assessors (hoja
saiban in) to serve in the event that one of the regular assessors was unable. Lay
Assessor Proposal, supra note 12, at § 1(1)(i).
44.
Id. § 1(1)(a)(A an).
45.
See Miyake, supra note 33.
46.
Lay Assessor Proposal, supra note 12, § 1(1)(a)(B an).
47.
See JFBA, Saibanin seido "tatakidai"ni tai suru iken [Opinion regarding the
"soundingboard"on the lay assessor system] (May 30, 2003), at httpJ/www.nichibenren.or.jp
jpfkatsudo/sytyouliken/data2003_23.pdf [hereinafter Nichibenren].
48.
Inouye Addendum, supra note 13, § 1(1)(a)-(i).
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majority necessary to convict. This is a compromise between the two
other alternatives, and because it presents a middle ground between
the others and is the most recently developed, it is the leading
proposal.
B. Powers of Lay Assessors
The JRC proposal makes clear that the primary power of the
49
assessors is to determine both guilt and sentencing of defendants.
Furthermore, the proposal suggests that if the chairing judge deems
it appropriate, assessors may also offer their opinions on and discuss
matters of procedure and issues of law, although it is expressly stated
elsewhere that the final decision on these issues will be made by the
judge or judges. 50 The draft does not clarify what issues will be
considered legal, procedural, or factual, and given that such
explication has largely been unnecessary under the current allencompassing bench trials and comprehensive k6so appeals discussed
below, these minor details may prove significant in actual practice.
Under the proposal, in exercising their powers assessors may
question witnesses, seek information from the judge, and request
testimony of the defendant. 51 The assessor's affirmative role during
the trial is different from the traditionally passive role of jurors, who
generally are not free to interact with the other trial parties. 52
Empowering lay members to participate in both the guilt and
sentencing phases of criminal trials is practically very significant.
Nothing suggests that the pre-trial practices of police and
prosecutors, which results in the overwhelming number of defendants
in Japan confessing to their crimes, will change.5 3 Thus, for all but a
few showcase trials, the lay participants' primary role will not be
impersonating Henry Fonda and deciding the defendant's guilt or
innocence, but rather it will be assisting with finding an appropriate
punishment. This is important because U.S. research suggests that
lay participants tend to be less sympathetic to defendants and more
punitive than judges. 54 Extending these suppositions any further

49.

Lay Assessor Proposal, supra note 12, § l(2)(a).

50.

Id. §§ 1(2)(u), 1(3)(i).

51.
Id. § 1(2)(i).
52.
See, e.g., Tom M. Dees, III, Juries: On the Verge of Extinction?, 54 SMU L.
REV. 1755, 1769-84 (2001) (reviewing the movement in the United States to
reinvigorate jurors from their traditionally passive role).
53.
See JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 216 (noting nearly 94 percent of criminal
trials are where confessions have been obtained).
54.
L.J. Stalans & A.J. Lurigion, Lay and Professionals'Beliefs about Crime
and Criminal Sentencing: A Need for Theory, Perhaps Schema Theory, 17(3) CRIM.
JUST. & BEHAV. 333 (1990); L.J. Stalans & S.S. Diamond, Formation and Change in
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invites excessive speculation, but one can foresee that, contrary to the
reformers' expectations, these conclusions suggest the introduction of
the mixed court will in fact make criminal justice in Japan slower and
harsher.
C. Decisions by Mixed Courts
The proposal provides three options for the requisite majority to
render a judgment. All three options contemplate all of the judges
and assessors participating in a joint consultation and voting process
in which a simple majority of both judges and citizens wins. 55 Each
option, however, adds slightly different additional requirements.
Option A requires that at least one judge and one assessor consent to
any majority opinion. 56 This is the only option that survives in
Professor Inouye's addendum. 57 Option B requires that at least one
judge and one assessor be in the majority only when a decision is
against the defendant. 58 In other words, a majority of lay assessors
unsupported by any judge could vote to acquit a defendant, but to
convict him, the majority would need at least one judge to consent.
Option C provides that where the decision is against the defendant,
the decision must be supported by a majority of the judges and at
least one assessor. 59 Given the notion that lay participation is needed
because judges are too willing to confirm prosecutors' indictments,
Option C is an interesting rule. Option C leaves the decision with the
judge for many cases and fails to trust the citizen members to decide
when all lay assessors want to convict but no judge has been
convinced by the prosecutor's case.
It seems clear, therefore, that defendants under the new system
will not be protected by the requirement of unanimity seen in the
classic jury model. 60 Instead, protection from the dominance of one
group is provided for by requiring a mixture of lay assessors and
professionals to agree on the decision. How this protection is afforded
and the implications of the protection are still very unclear at this
stage. Furthermore, the voting dynamic is dependant on the
threshold issue of the court's composition, which remains unsettled.

Lay Evaluations of Criminal Sentencing: Misperception and Discontent, 14(3) LAW &
HUMAN BEHAV. 199 (1990).

Lay Assessor Proposal, supranote 12, § 1(3)(a).
55.
56.
Id. § 1(3)(a)(A an).
Inouye Addendum, supranote 13, § 1(3)(a).
57.
58.
Lay Assessor Proposal, supranote 12, § 1(3)(a)(B an).
59.
Id. § 1(3)(a)(C an).
60.
See ABRAMSON, supra note 18, at ch. 5 (reviewing the tradition of
unanimous jury decisions in England and the United States from 1367 until 1967 and
1972, respectively, and arguing for a return to unanimous decisions for democratic
reasons).
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Practicing lawyers, as represented by the Japanese Federation of Bar
Associations (JFBA), reject the majority approach and argue for a
61
unanimity requirement.
The Investigation Committee's draft also is ambiguous regarding
the procedure by which the voting process will occur. It is implicit
that deliberations among judges and assessors will be done
communally rather than as separate deliberations by subgroups of
judges and lay assessors as some have advocated. 6 2 Further, it is
unclear who will direct the discussion and voting process and by what
means these processes will take place. Far from being a trivial point
that might be addressed in the court rules or by custom, these
procedural issues are crucial. First, as should be obvious, procedure
often determines outcome. Second, numerous commentators have
voiced, in the tired old Orientalists' terms, concern about Japanese
lay participants' ability to play an active role in deliberation. 63 Third,
as is discussed below, even absent any unique Japanese cultural or
social reasons, foreign experience and empirical research suggest that
ensuring active lay participant involvement in the process is
extremely difficult at best.6 4 Practicing lawyers have also recognised
the proposal's lack of rules concerning the relationship between
judges and lay assessors and made some recommendations in this
65
area.
D. Claims Covered by Mixed Courts
A consensus that the mixed court shall only adjudicate in trials
for serious crimes seems to have been achieved. 66 However, the
Investigation Committee proposal sets out three different options for
defining what are serious matters justiciable by the mixed court.
The first option uses the current standard by which criminal
cases are automatically heard by a panel of three judges at the trial
stage (h6tei gegi jiken).67 This covers a variety of 183 crimes that

61.
Nichibenren, supra note 47, at 4-5.
62.
See Kodner, supra note 5, at 251-52 (recommending that professional and
lay judges deliberate apart from each other).
63.
See, e.g., Kiss, supra note 5, at 273-78, 283 ("Japanese cultural
characteristics such as the hierarchical nature of Japanese society, the high level of
trust for authority figures in Japanese society, Japanese group consciousness, and the
desire to maintain harmony would make it difficult for a mixed court system to
function effectively.").
64.
See Kodner, supra note 5, at 247-49 (reviewing failings of German lay
assessor system to achieve meaningful participation by lay participants despite their
four-year terms).
65.
Nichibenren, supranote 47, at 30.
66.
See JRC Report, supra note 7, at ch. IV, pt. 1(3).
67.
Lay Assessor Proposal, supranote 12, § 1(4)(a)(A an); Saibansho h6 [Courts
Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 26(2), available at http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-
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68
generally carry a minimum sentence of one year imprisonment. In
actual cases in the year 2000, this standard would have resulted in
4,569, or 6.7 percent, of the 68,190 defendants formally charged
69
having their cases heard by lay assessors.
The second option would provide a lay assessor trial for any
defendant charged with a crime that carried a possible penalty of
death or life imprisonment. 70 This covers fifty-five crimes, including
murder, rape resulting in death, robbery resulting in death, and
arson where people are present. 71 This standard is a subset of the
first proposal, as all crimes under this definition would be covered
under the first option. In 2000, this standard would have resulted in
2,348, or 3.4 percent, of all criminal trials being heard by lay assessor
72
panels.
The third option is the narrowest. Under this rule, only
intentional crimes resulting in the death of the victim would be
74
The third
covered. 73 Forty-one crimes fit within this definition.
option, while the narrowest, is not coterminous with the other options
and includes some crimes not covered by either of the other two
options. Using this standard, for 2000 there would have been 789
people, or 1.1 percent of the total number of defendants, eligible for a
75
mixed trial.
Professor Inouye's draft adds another choice that combines the
second and third options. 76 This results in slightly broader coverage
than the second option but narrower than the first. It is estimated
that this standard would allow about 2,800 cases annually, or
approximately 4.1 percent of criminal trials, to be heard by lay

bin/idxsearch.cgi (n.d.) (defining claims heard by three-judge panels). All of the options,
however, exclude claims under Criminal Code articles 77 and 78 for civil war and
conspiracy. Lay Assessor Proposal, supra note 12, § 1(4)(a).

68.

Investigation Committee, Zaimei ichiran [Summary of applicable crimes]

(Mar. 11, 2003), at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singilsihoulkentoukai/saibanin/dail4/
14siryoul-l.pdf [hereinafter Summary of Applicable Crimes].

69.

Investigation Committee, Tsaj5 dai isshin jiken [General cases at first

instance] (Mar. 11, 2003), at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/saibanin/
dail4/14siryoul-2.pdf [hereinafter General Cases at First Instance].
70.
Lay Assessor Proposal, supra note 12, § 1(4)(a) (B an).

71.
72.

Summary of Applicable Crimes, supra note 68.
General Cases at FirstInstance, supra note 69.

73.

Lay Assessor Proposal, supra note 12, § 1(4)(a) (C an).

74.

Summary of Applicable Crimes, supra note 68.

75.
Investigation Committee, Shiryd 1-3 [Attachment 1-3] (Mar. 11, 2003), at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singisihou/kentoukai/saibanin/dail4/14siryoul-3.pdf.
Inouye Addendum, supra note 13, § 1(4)(a)(a).
76.
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assessors.7 7 Again, this appears to be a compromise position to reflect
78
a split between supporters of the first and second options.
It is interesting to note that the debate surrounding the options
in this area does not seem to be about the substantive differences
among the various definitions-that is, which crimes are best
adjudged by the community rather by legal experts. 79 Instead, the
debate appears to be focused on the pragmatic procedural question of
what is the ideal volume of cases to be heard by mixed courts, which
definition best produces that volume, and whether the system should
be introduced gradually.8 0 Thus, those who support a comprehensive
lay assessor system tend to favor the first option, while those who
8
seek the narrowest effect of the new system favor the third option. '
The focus on the number of cases, to the exclusion of substantive
differences among the definitions, is consistent with early comments
that the purpose of the lay assessor system is not to better guarantee
defendants' rights but to improve the system of justice and to
encourage democratic involvement.8 2 Of course, subsumed within the
applicable-cases debate is a critical question that is not addressed
anywhere in the proposal: How many cases can the court system,
under its current or revised budget, efficiently and economically
process? As is discussed below, because the Investigation Committee
is focused on the legal and procedural aspects of the system, it does
not directly address this question. Regardless, this is a question that
politicians will have to consider in the final proposal.
The proposal confirms that if there are pendent or ancillary
claims to the lay assessable claim those can also be heard by the
empanelled mixed court. 83 Similarly, in instances in which the
prosecution changes an indictment from a crime covered by the mixed
court to a charge not covered by the system, the judges and assessors

77.

Reform Panel Eyes 4 to 6 Lay Judges, ASAHI SHIMBUN, Oct. 30, 2003,

available at 2003 WL 60237266.
78.
Masahito Inouye, "Kangaerarerusanbanin seido no gaiyo nitsuite" no
setsumei

[Explanation of

"concerning the

lay

assessor system

outline

under

consideration'] (Oct. 28, 2003), at 11, available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/
singi/sihoulkentoukai/saibaninldai28/28siryou4.pdf [hereinafter Inouye Explanation].
79.
Investigation Committee, "Saiban-in seido ni tsuite" no setsumei
[Explanation of "concerningthe lay assessor system'], at 4-5 (Mar. 11, 2003), available
at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/saibanin/dail3/13siryoul-2.pdf
[hereinafter Explanatory Notes]; Minutes 13th Meeting, supra note 42, at 4.
80.
Investigation Committee, Gijiroku dai 14 kai [Minutes of 14th meeting]
(Mar. 25, 2003), at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/saibanin/dail4/
14gijiroku.html [hereinafter Minutes 14th Meeting].
81.
Id.; Nichibenren, supra note 47, at 6 (supporting the broadest definition).
82.
JRC Report, supra note 7, at ch. IV, pt. 1(3) ("The new participation system
is to be introduced not for the individual defendants, but rather because it has
important significance for the general public and as an adjudication system.").
83.
Lay Assessor Proposal, supranote 12, § 1(4)(a)(i).
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may still deliberate together on the charge.8 4 However, the ultimate
decision in that case will be decided by the judge or judges alone.8 5
Thus, in applying these subsidiary rules, defendants will receive the
benefit (or detriment) of the lay assessor system for more claims than
those strictly covered by the definition that is eventually adopted.
Whatever standard is adopted, it is important to appreciate that
whether a lay assessment panel is convened is solely at the
prosecutor's discretion. First, as has been well-documented by others,
the decision regarding whether even to bring a formal charge or to
suspend prosecution is at the prosecutor's discretion. 8 6 Second, the
prosecutor has the discretion to bring charges for a crime within the
definition adopted or a charge for a similar offence not covered by the
definition. Third, the prosecutor has the discretion to over-engage the
system by charging a defendant with an applicable crime and then
changing it to a non-applicable crime or by including pendent nonlay-assessable claims along with the primary claim covered by the
definition. Furthermore, the judiciary and defendants have no
discretion regarding whether to engage or suspend the system.
Defendants and judges have no control over whether an applicable or
non-applicable charge is brought, and if one is brought they have no
right to waive a hearing by a lay assessor panel, even when the
defendant admits guilt.
The prosecutor's control has at least three, and likely more,
important implications. First, although one of the primary motivations
of the judicial reform movement was to limit the power and
discretionary control of the prosecutor's office, the lay assessor system
as designed will in fact increase that office's power. Second, given that
the prosecutor's office will control the flow of cases into the system by
being able to increase or decrease the number of mixed-court trials, the
pressure to, in effect, "plea bargain" will increase, something that is at
87
least formalistically antithetical to Japanese prosecutorial culture.
Third, the inability to waive the process even in confessed and
summary cases will have serious efficiency implications and economic
costs for the entire system.8 8

84.
85.

Id.
Id.

86.

See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 104-16.

See id. at 107-16, 210 n.28 (discussing factors motivating a prosecutor's
87.
decision to suspend prosecution, which is akin to plea bargaining).
88.
Again, this position is justified by the rationale that the purpose of the lay
assessor is not defendants' rights but improving democracy and the justice that the
system provides. JRC Report, supra note 7, at ch. IV, pt. 1(3).
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E. Selection of Lay Assessors
The Investigation Committee proposes that assessors be selected
randomly from voter rolls in the district where the case is being
heard.8 9 Those who are called have an obligation to appear for incourt juror selection procedures and, if empanelled, the trial. They
also have a duty to act truthfully, fairly, and diligently. 90 It is
interesting that they are further under an obligation to voice an
opinion at deliberations, a provision presumably included to address
the fear of passivity of lay assessors but seemingly hortatory as it is
practically impossible to enforce. There are penalties for breaching
any of these duties. 91 In further support of these obligations,
employers and others are prohibited from penalizing persons
92
nominated or selected for duty.
The proposal also provides three options for limiting who might be
called. 93 Under the first option, people under thirty years of age would
be excluded, and under the second option people under twenty-five
would be excluded. The default rule of no explicit age restriction would
exclude people under the suffrage age of twenty. 94 The Inouye
addendum mandates an age requirement of twenty-five years. 95 Again,
this seems to reflect a compromise position which possibly fulfils the
JRC's call for the lay assessor system "to reflect sound social
commonsense." 96 Nevertheless, it is hard to see how such age
limitations will not compromise the democratic objective sought by the
overall lay assessor plan. In any event, these options have raised only
97
limited discussion.
The proposal also excludes a number of people from eligibility.
Among those excluded are people who do not have a junior high
school education (nine years of education) and those who have been
imprisoned or are imprisoned or indicted. 98 Most politicians are also
excluded, as are most lawyers and quasi-lawyers, including members

89.
Lay Assessor Proposal, supra note 12, § 2(1).
90.
Id. § 3(2)-(3).
91.
Id. § 7.
92.
Id. § 8.
93.
Id. § 2(1)(B an)-(C an).
94.
K6shoku senkyo h6 [Public Office Election Act], Law No. 100 of 1950, art. 9,
availableat http:/law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi (n.d.).
95.
Inouye Addendum, supranote 13, § 2(1).
96.
Inouye Explanation, supra note 78, at 12-13.
97.
See Minutes 14th Meeting, supra note 80, at 42-45; A "Jury" System for
Japan, MAINICHI SHIMBUN, Mar. 17, 2003 (conspicuously not discussing the age
variations). But see Nichibenren, supra note 47, at 7-8 (arguing younger adults should
not be excluded).
98.
Lay Assessor Proposal, supra note 12, § 2(2).
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of the bar, legal academics, and government lawyers. 99 In addition,
people involved with the case directly or indirectly, such as relatives,
cannot act as assessors. 10 0 The proposal also includes a list of persons
who may opt out of service. This includes people over age seventy,
students, and people who have served in a lay judicial capacity in the
recent past. 10 1
In addition to these categorical exceptions, more ambiguous
exclusions exist for those with prejudices or beliefs that impair their
ability to act neutrally 102 and those with illnesses or other
unavoidable reasons that would make serving as an assessor a
hardship. 0 3 In applying these various exceptions, it is envisaged that
there will be limited voir dire questioning. 104 The Investigation
Committee has suggested that the exception for illness or other
unavoidable reasons might be interpreted flexibly to release those
with child or other primary caregiver duties and business people
whose absence would cause significant economic detriment. 105 In
applying this standard, it will be important to see whether the courts
generously exercise the exception to the point of endangering the
representativeness of the group of lay assessors eventually
empanelled. This is what has happened to a large degree in the
United States; it also reflects the criticisms of the Narrow Lay
10 6
Participation Organs in Japan discussed below.
F. Procedureof Mixed Courts
Adopting the lay assessor system will require fundamental
changes in Japanese criminal procedure and trial practice. Currently,
trials are held pursuant to monthly hearings, 107 but because
assessors cannot be empanelled for such a duration, new procedures
will have to be developed to facilitate consecutive trials. The proposal
acknowledges this fact but does not fully address the issue. Thus, the
proposal merely notes that the revised practice should emphasize
l0 8
speed and easy comprehension, and it must be studied further.

99.
Id. § 2(3)(a).
100.
Id. § 2(4).
101.
Id. § 2(5).
102.
Id. §§ 2(2)(a)(u), 2(2)(i), 2(6).
103.
Id. § 2(5)(ki).
104.
Id. § 2(9).
105.
Explanatory Notes, supra note 79, at 8.
106.
See ABRAMSON, supra note 18, at ch. 3.
107.
See RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO, supra note 34, at 139-40, 269 n.17 (noting also
that this is despite the fact that, for example in civil matters, the Code of Civil
Procedure article 182 [Minji sosh5 h, Law No. 109 of 1996] and various court rules
require the courts to hold hearings on a continuous basis as much as possible).
108.
Lay Assessor Proposal, supra note 12, § 4(1)-(6).
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Similarly, the proposal notes that possible modification of the
rules of evidence warrants further study, but in principle they will
have to be modified to encourage speed and easy comprehension. 10 9
The proposal, however, does not address the fact that jury-based
systems have developed highly refined evidentiary rules to prevent
lay participants from being unduly prejudiced, and Japan's rules have
not evolved in this manner because of the country's historical custom
of bench trials. 1 10 Similarly, as noted above, the proposal is silent
regarding the procedural rules judges are to employ during
deliberations with lay assessors.
Post trial procedure also will need to be modified. Regarding the
drafting of judgments, the proposal makes clear that judges will write
them."1 Others have pointed out that from an accountability and
transparency perspective, placing this power exclusively in the hands
of judges can be extremely problematic when combined with a
majority voting rule and lack of confirmation power by the lay
assessors.

112

It is unclear whether assessors will be required to sign the
judgments and whether their obligations will end with the
announcement or signing of the judgment. 113 Professor Inouye's draft
advocates that the lay assessors will not sign the judgments and will
be discharged when the decision is announced. 114 The different
options have important practical implications for the assessors and on
the costs of the system, because non-discharged assessors would
presumably still have a commitment to the proceeding that would
preclude their return to work or other obligations pending final
approval. On the other hand, if lay assessors are discharged without
signing the judgment, nothing ensures the accuracy and transparency
of the proceedings' record, which is of course where its precedential
value lies. This balance is likely tipped by the fact that if the lay
assessors are required to sign the judgments, the probable result will

109.
Id. § 4(7).
110.
See RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO, supra note 34, at 145-46, 270 n.34 (noting that
little attention is given to evidentiary rules in Japan because the judge himself decides
what is and is not admissible).
Lay Assessor Proposal, supra note 12, § 4(8)(a).
111.
112.
See Lempert, Citizen Participation,supra note 5, at 12 (noting that
professional judges are capable of providing legal rationale for decisions "regardless of
what actually motivated [them)").
Lay Assessor Proposal, supra note 12, § 4(8)(i). Three options are
113.
presented: (A) pursuant to which the lay assessors are required to sign the judgments,
and their duty terminates when the final judgment is handed down; (B) pursuant to
which the lay assessors are required to sign the judgments, but their duty terminates
when the decision is announced; and (C) pursuant to which lay assessors do not have to
sign the judgments, and their duty terminates when the decision is announced.
114.
Inouye Addendum, supra note 13, § 4(8).
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be the disclosure of their identities, which is a significant concern of
the Investigation Committee. 1 15
The process and standard of appeal for lay assessor cases is also
undecided. The underlying issue arises because, reflecting Japan's
present bench trial system, first appeals (k~so) may be based on
mistakes of fact as well as law. 116 The first option in the Investigation
Committee's proposal is to keep this k6so appeal. 117 This is also the
position endorsed in Professor Inouye's addendum. 118 The second
option, however, limits first appeals to issues of law. 119 An alternative
to this option is also to allow appeals of sentencing. 120 The third
option, similar to the k~so appeal, would allow appellate judges to
hear issues of sentencing and facts as well as law, but it also would
require the appellate court to annul a mixed court's factual and
sentence determinations, which presumably would entail a
significantly higher standard than simply remanding or overturning
a decision.' 2 ' The final option would create an entirely new appeal122
late system that incorporates lay assessors.
Thus, the first and third options would continue to allow, in
essence, two bites at the factual cherry. This, of course, would
introduce the possibility of judges overruling lay assessors on
arguably the latter's area of expertise, viz., a commonsense
understanding of facts and the appropriate punishment. On the other
hand, the second option avoids appellate judges overruling lay
assessors on the latter's expertise, but the lack of the second bite
allowed by the k6so appeal is said to have undermined the former
jury system as discussed below. 123 The fourth option of creating a new
appellate system incorporating lay assessors would address many of
the shortcomings of the other approaches but would entail the
creation of an additional level of infrastructure.

G. Publicity of Mixed Courts
One of the most controversial aspects of the proposed lay
assessor system is its rules regarding trial publicity. Under the

115.

Inouye Explanation, supra note 78, at 20.

116.

RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO, supra note 34, at 145.

117.
Lay Assessor Proposal, supra note 12, § 5(A an).
118.
Inouye Addendum, supra note 13, § 5.
119.
Lay Assessor Proposal, supra note 12, § 5(B an).
120.
Id. § 5(B an).
121.
Id. § 5(C an).
122.
Id. § 5(D an).
123.
See, e.g., Mamoru Urabe, Wagakuni ni okeru baishin saiban no kenkyct [A
study on trial by jury in Japan], in 9 SHIHO KENSHUSHO CHOSA SOSHO [THE SERIES IN
INVESTIGATIONS BY THE LEGAL TRAINING AND RESEARCH INSTITUTE] 1, 1968, translated
in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 483, 485-88 (Hideo Tanaka ed., 1976).

958

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 37935

proposed rules, lay assessors are obligated, upon penalty of
imprisonment and fines, not to divulge any information regarding the
12 4
deliberations, individual opinions, or voting of the mixed court.
Professor Inouye's draft narrows this proposal slightly by forbidding
leaking of "secrets obtained in the execution of the job." 125 In
application and as alluded above, this rule would seem to preclude
any mixed court judgment from including important details such as
the size of the majority that rendered the decision and the split
between the judges and citizens. This, in turn, undermines any
transparency in the application of the rules concerning the necessary
composition of a majority prescribed elsewhere in the proposal.
The publicity rules also ensure that Japanese lay participants
will not be able to write tell-all biographies as some jurors in the
murder trial of O.J. Simpson did. 126 It is interesting that redress for
this situation is already partially covered by private law in Japan.
The matter arose when Chihiro Isa wrote a confession regarding his
experience as a juror in an assault and murder case in Okinawa,
which as a protectorate of the United States until 1972 had criminal
jury trials. 127 The defendant in the case later sued Isa for tortious
injury and in 1987 won Y500,000 (approximately U.S.$3,500) in a
decision that was confirmed by the Japanese Supreme Court in
1994.128 Needless to say, the fines and imprisonment envisioned
under the lay assessor proposal will probably exceed this private law
liability.
In addition to these existing private law limitations and
proposed restrictions on lay assessors, the proposal prohibits third
parties from contacting lay assessors for information. 129 Reinforcing
this, the proposal provides that the court is prohibited from divulging
any personal information about lay assessors. 130 The proposal also
prohibits the mass media or any other person from soliciting
information or trying to influence the lay assessors; those not
1 31
adhering to the rule are punished with fines and imprisonment.

124.
125.

Lay Assessor Proposal, supra note 12, at § 7(2).
Inouye Addendum, supra note 13, at § 8(2).

126.
See, e.g., MICHAEL KNOX & MIKE WALKER, THE PRIVATE DIARY OF AN O.J.
JUROR: BEHIND THE SCENES OF THE TRIAL OF THE CENTURY (1995).
127.
CHIHIRO ISA, GYAKUTEN: AMERIKA SHIHAI SHITA OKINAWA NO BAISHIN
SAIBAN [REVERSAL: A JURY TRIAL IN OKINAWA UNDER AMERICAN CONTROL] (1977).

128.
Judgment of Feb. 8, 1994, 48 MINSHO 2-149 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 8, 1994); James
J. Nelson, Culture, Commerce, and the Constitution:Legal and Extra-Legal Restraints
on Freedom of Expression in the Japanese PublishingIndustry, 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN
L.J. 45, 64-66 (1996) (discussing the case); Dan Rosen, Private Lives and Public Eyes:
Privacy in the United States and Japan,6 FLA. J. INT'L. L. 141, 154 (1990) (covering the
case through the Tokyo High Court).
129.
Lay Assessor Proposal, supra note 12, §§ 3(2), 7(2).
Id. § 8(1).
130.
131.
Id §§ 7(3), 8(3).
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Included within this restriction, the press is instructed to censor itself
regarding information that might prejudice the assessors before or
during a mixed trial. Similar to the protests that recently helped
defeat the Japanese Human Rights Commission bill from
enactment, 13 2 the mass media has organized vigorous protests of
1 33
these provisions on civil libertarian and freedom of speech grounds.
The JFBA also unequivocally rejects the calls for restricting the
13 4
media's coverage of lay assessor trials.
H. Costs of the Mixed Court Proposal
As noted above, the costs of the lay assessor system are largely
ignored by the Investigation Committee. One area where it is
addressed is a provision for compensation of lay assessors' travel,
necessary lodging, and per diem expenses. 135 It is not expected that
this will be a major cost of introducing the system, however. Rather,
significant costs are likely to be incurred in initiating the new system,
creating the necessary infrastructure for the system, and
administering the new proceedings.
Initiating the lay assessor system will require a number of startup costs. Court officials, including judges, will need to be trained in
the requirements and special considerations of dealing with nonlegally trained people. In addition, introduction of the system will
likely need to be accompanied by a public awareness campaign to
educate defense lawyers and to inform the public about the system.
Some of these expenses are already being incurred: the Supreme

132.

Leon Wolff, Future of Human Rights Regulation in Japan, 14 HUMAN

RIGHTS DEFENDER (Dec. 2003).

133.
Nihon minkan hbsb renmei [Japanese Union of Private Broadcasters],
Saibanin seido to shuzai/h6d6 to no kankei ni tsuite no iken [Opinion regarding the
relationship with collecting data information and the lay assessor system] (May 15,
2003), at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/saibanin/dail7/17siryou3.pdf;
Nihon shinbun kybkai [Japanese Newspapers Association], Saibanin seido ni taisuru
kaiken [Position regarding the lay assessor system] (May 16, 2003), at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/saibanin/dail7/17siryoul.pdf;
Nihon
zasshi kybkai [Japanese Magazine Association], H~d5 no jiya wo odokasu "saibanin
seido" no mondai ten [Problem areas with the "lay assessor system" that threaten
freedom of expression] (May 16, 2003), at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou
kentoukailsaibanin/dail7/17siryou2.pdf; The Media and a Jury System, JAPAN TIMES,
Nov. 13, 2002.
134.
Nichibenren, supra note 47, at 37-38.
135.
This is likely to be consistent with the Prosecutorial Review Commission
amounts (e.g., up to Y8700 per night for accommodations). Kensatsu shinsa kai ha
[Prosecutorial Review Commission Act], Law No. 147 of 1948, arts. 29, 39, available at
http:/flaw.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi; Kensatsu shinsa-in nado no rybhi, tbjitsu
oyobi shukuhakury5 wo sadameru seirei [Order Regulating Prosecutorial Review
Commissions Costs for Lodging, Transportation, and Per Diem], Order No. 31 of 1949,
availableat http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-binlidxsearch.cgi.
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Court, prosecutor's office, and JFBA are all engaging in research in
136
anticipation of the lay assessor system's adoption.
Even assuming the various actors are up to speed, the
infrastructure of the court system will need to be modified to
accommodate lay assessors. For example, courtrooms will need to be
modified to accommodate more people, 137 more conference rooms in
courthouses will be required for deliberation, and the entire system,
from parking to toilets, will need to be expanded to handle the
138
additional traffic.
Administering the lay assessor system on a daily basis will be
more costly than the present system run by trained law experts.
Some of these costs can be calculated. For example, an on-going
induction program for new lay assessors will likely be necessary.
Most of the recurring administration expenses, however, are
incalculable beforehand. For example, conducting lay assessor trials
will necessarily be more complex, and therefore more time
consuming, than trials heard by professionals. The entire procedure
will need to be slowed down to a level sufficient for a layperson to
understand. More debate will be required on evidentiary matters
given the possible heightened prejudicial effect on amateurs, and
more time will be required for deliberation to avoid any taint of
judicial dominance. In short, adopting the lay assessor system will be
costly in both the short- and long-term. Nonetheless, it is not clear to
what extent this has been considered or whether this will eventually
affect whatever system the legislature adopts.

136.
See, e.g., Ministry of Justice, Saibaninseido oyobi kensatsu shinsa kai seido
ni tsuite no iken bosha no kekka gaiy6 [General summary results for solicitated opinions
on the lay assessor system and prosecutorialinvestigation committee] (July 18, 2003), at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/saibanin/dai22/22siryoul.pdf (this report
is a 294 page summary of 842 opinions collected regarding the lay assessor system);
Nichibenren, supra note 47.
137.
This raises a host of interesting subsidiary questions such as how lay
participants are treated architecturally. See, e.g., JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION AND
SPACE MANAGEMENT:

A GUIDE FOR

ARCHITECTS,

COURT ADMINISTRATORS,

AND

PLANNERS (F. Michael Wong ed., 2001). Japan faced similar issues in the modern era in
removing the prosecutors from a raised dais in light of post-war reforms and
accommodating juries during the pre-War era.
138.
See Kiss, supra note 5, at 282 n.177 (noting the infrastructure costs in
refitting courtrooms to accommodate juries and noting this was discussed in the South
African context by Marshall S. Huebner, Who Decides? Restructuring CriminalJustice
for a Democratic South Africa, 102 YALE L.J. 961, 975 (1993)). Only two courtrooms
fitted with jury-boxes remain in Japan, and both are attached to universities in Kyoto
(Ritsumeikan) and Yokohama (Toin) as museums.
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I. Summary of the Investigation Committee's Proposal
Although a number of crucial details are still being debated,
based on the Investigation Committee's interim proposal, the
fundamental structure of the lay assessor system and the likelihood
of its eventual adoption appear predictable. The system will be a
mixed panel of both professional judges and non-expert citizens
deliberating together on all matters and deciding issues of fact and
sentencing by some mixed majority vote. Only serious crimes will be
heard under the system, and the procedure cannot be avoided by
defendants or waived by courts. There will likely be restrictions on
publicity around and about lay assessor trials. The core issues of
exactly what the composition of the mix between judges and laypeople
will be and what specific crimes will be considered serious enough to
be heard have not yet been decided. Furthermore, the proposal also
leaves largely unaddressed the critical issues of procedure and
funding. These two items may indeed be the "devil in the details" that
in hindsight are critical to whether the lay assessor system achieves
the dual objectives of better justice and a more democratic process.

IV. DOMESTIC HISTORICAL CONTEXT

As the JRC recognized, 139 Japan's judicial system historically
has had a number of roles for laypeople to play. Therefore, the
question arises as to why these existing schemes have failed to
achieve the outcomes cited as rationales for adopting the new lay
assessor system-i.e., better justice and greater democratic
involvement. The answer to this question should provide a useful
standard by which to test whether the current proposal will likely
fulfill its objectives.
The following section parses out the standard and tests the
present lay assessor model against it. First, this section provides a
rough categorization of a number of different schemes in which
laypeople in Japan historically have participated in judicial decision
making as either "Broad Lay Participation Organs" or "Narrow Lay
Participation Organs." Next, background and historical data on the
various schemes' use are introduced. From this data, there are two
major failings of the current organs that have prevented them from
achieving the general objectives of lay participation: Broad Lay
Participation Organs have been marginalized by non-use, and
Narrow Lay Participation Organs have been captured by non-

139.

JRC Report, supra note 7, at ch. IV, pt. 1, § 2.
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laypeople. These lessons are then applied to test the present lay
assessor proposal. This section concludes by finding that the current
proposal addresses some of the limitations but remains vulnerable to
others. Based on this finding this section argues that the overall
success of the lay assessor system is contingent on the affirmative
support of the prosecutor's office, the judiciary, and the government.
A. Broad Lay ParticipationOrgans
The term "Broad Lay Participation Organs" is used to refer to
those schemes that involve a wide cross-section of the general
population in some aspect of the judicial decision making process. The
classic example is the jury system. Typically, Broad Lay Participation
Organs call for participants from the general population without
regard to any special qualifications or abilities of the people. Broad
Lay Participation Organs are also characterized by being separated
from the input or influence of legal specialists during deliberation. In
practical terms, this means there is a greater risk that Broad Lay
Participation Organs will technically misapply the law but a lesser
risk that they will be elitist or bereft of commonsense understanding.
1. Juries (1923-1943)
Japan enacted a jury system in 1923, effective in 1928, as part of
the so-called Taisho Democracy Movement. 140 The system was
suspended
in
1943
because
of
disuse
and
increasing
authoritarianism. 141 Because the law was only suspended, it remains
on the books and can be reinitiated. In fact the Courts Act of 1947
142
anticipates and provides for the return of juries.
Japan's jury system had twelve jurors chosen at random from
literate male citizens over thirty years of age who had resided in the
same city for two years or longer and paid not less than Y3 in
national tax over the prior two consecutive years. 143 Thus, the
eligibility requirements were not broadly representative of society.
However, they shadowed eligibility for suffrage 144 and were not out-

140.
Baishin h5 [Jury Act], Law No. 50 of 1923, available at http://law.egov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi (n.d.).
141.
Baishin h5 no teishi ni kan suru hbritsu [Act Regarding the Suspension of
the Jury Act], Law No. 88 of 1943, available at http:/Ilaw.e-gov.go.jp/cgibin/idxsearch.cgi.
142.
Saibansho h5 [Courts Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 3(3), available at
http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi (n.d.)
143.
Baishin h6 [Jury Act], art. 12.
144.
See HANE, supra note 31, at 229 (noting suffrage was limited to males who
paid V3 in annual tax in 1919, which covered slightly more than five percent of the
population).
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of-place when compared to other countries' contemporaneous
requirements, such as those of the United States that historically had
restricted eligibility to property-owning white males. 145 Japan's jury
system was only used in trials in which the criminal defendant was
subject to a penalty of death or life imprisonment, or imprisonment
for a minimum of one year and a maximum of three years. The
defendant could opt out of a jury trial for crimes with punishments of
death or life imprisonment, but a jury trial was required when the
defendant was charged with other eligible offences. The jury
deliberated by itself, and its decisions were by majority. The jury only
answered special verdicts on matters of fact rather than offering
general guilty or innocent judgments. 146 Furthermore, similar to
judgments notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV or judgment non
obstante veredicto) in U.S. civil jury trials, 14 7 the Japanese judge
could call a retrial if he disagreed with the jury's decision. 148 In
addition, because the jury alone ruled on matters of fact, appeals from
jury verdicts only allowed appellate judges to overturn on matters of
law. 14 9 This is the same as the present common law rule on appealing
jury verdicts; however, it differs from the standard k6so practice in
Japan where appeals on matters of fact are allowed. The justification
for the k6so rule derives from the notion that appellate judges are
equally if not better positioned to make factual determinations as
trial judges. Also significant, a defendant who chose a jury trial and
150
lost, bore the cost for the empanelment.
Despite defendants initially electing jury trials frequently-143
were held in 1929 over time their popularity declined precipitously.
In 1942 there were only two. 1 51 Commentators offer a wide variety of
explanations for the decline of juries; most focus on the effect of
structural elements of the jury law and on defendants' and their legal
counsels' strategic considerations.15 2 They suggest that because jury
verdicts were technically non-binding (that is, the judge could order a
retrial if he disagreed) and because the jury issued its verdict on
special verdict forms that judges drafted without the input of counsel,

145.
For example, non-white male jurors were still rare in many U.S. states
until the 1960s, and property qualifications were not eliminated in England until 1972.
See ABRAMSON, supra note 18, at 108-15; JOHN BALDWIN & MICHAEL MCCONVILLE,
JURY TRIALS 94 (1979).

146.

Baishin h6 [Jury Act], arts. 29, 77, 88, 91.

147.

See FED. R. Civ. P. 50.

148.
Baishin h5 [Jury Act], art. 95.
149.
Baishin h5 [Jury Act], art. 101.
150.
Baishin h6 [Jury Act], art. 107.
151.
See Urabe, supra note 123, at 482 n.(a) (providing a chart listing the
number of cases tried by jury between 1928 and 1942).
152.
See, e.g., id. at 485-91 (giving explanations for the unpopularity of jury
trials).
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there was little benefit to defendants in electing juries. Instead,
defendants selected bench trials to ingratiate themselves with the
trial judges and to maintain the option of a k6so appeal. These
criticisms are important today because many of the provisions for the
new lay assessor system (such as the inability of a defendant to elect
out of the system, the questions over appeal rights, and the majority
decision making rules) have been influenced by analysis of this
earlier experience.
This critique of the old jury system, however, might not be as
predictive for the proposed lay assessor scheme as its drafters
assume. In other words, the Investigation Committee might be
mistaken in relying too much on the lessons of the old jury system to
educate their design of the new lay assessor program. First, the
lynchpin of the structural arguments against the jury law-that
defendants were not better off in jury trials-is undermined by the
data. For the 484 jury trials held over the fifteen years of use, 16.7
percent resulted in acquittal. 153 This is significantly higher than the
nearly perfect conviction rate experienced today. 154 In short, juries
mattered and they benefited defendants. Second, in a comparative
context, the combination of structural and strategic reasons that
commentators suggest caused the decline of the jury trial in Japan is
somewhat circumspect. The United States has the same combination
of structural elements in civil cases, yet it has not resulted in the
elimination of juries in that country. Finally, it seems equally if not
more plausible that the decline of the jury reflected the changing
political and social climate of Japan in the 1930s and 1940s.155 That
is, the decline of the Taisho Democracy Movement and the rise of an
authoritarian state mobilized for war made all parties more inclined
to rely on the state sanctioned judges rather than newly introduced
popular democratic institutions. 156 Whatever the cause for the
demise, it is significant that only fifteen juries were empanelled
during the last five years of the law. In other words, before the law
was suspended it was already marginalized into irrelevance by nonuse.

153.
Id. at 485.
154.
See JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 215-18.
155.
See HANE,supra note 31, at ch. 12 (describing the political climate at the
time which was one of rising militancy). Supporting this interpretation is also the
suspension law itself, which provided: 'The Jury Act will be made effective again after
the end of the present war at a date as proscribed by accompanying Imperial order."
Baishin h5 no teishi ni kan suru hbritsu [Act Regarding the Suspension of the Jury
Act], Law No. 88 of 1943, supp. art. 3, available at http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgibinlidxsearch.cgi (n.d.).
156.
See Lempert, Citizen Participation,supra note 5, at 10 (noting also decline
of juries in Spain, German, and Russia with rise of militarism and autocracy).
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2. Prosecutorial Review Commissions
Prosecutorial Review Commissions (kensatsu shinsa kai) are lay
advisory bodies composed of eleven citizens who may review
15 7
prosecutors' exercise of discretion in decisions not to prosecute.
There are 201 Commissions with at least one in each of Japan's fifty
district court jurisdictions. 158 Much like the proposed lay assessor
system and the old jury system, members of the commissions are
selected at random from voter rolls; however, they sit for six months
and meet quarterly or as called. 159 A case comes before a
Prosecutorial Review Commission when a victim, proxy, or a
Commission itself brings a complaint against the prosecutor's office
for failure to pursue an alleged offence. 160 The scheme evolved in
response to American Occupation reformers advocating a grand jury
system to control over-indicting by prosecutors and the specific-Japan
situation in which under-indicting by prosecutors was, and remains,
the primary problem. 161 Once a complaint has been brought, a
Commission reviews the allegations and the prosecutors' explanation
for not bringing charges. Based on the evidence, the Commission then
regarding whether an
issues non-binding recommendations
162
indictment should be issued.
Prosecutorial Review Commissions are not well known and
correspondingly are not often engaged. 163 In 2000 only about 0.21
164
percent of the 884,700 non-indictments resulted in a complaint.
Furthermore, even when engaged, the process rarely results in any
action. Of the few cases brought, only in 5.5 percent did Commissions
recommend that prosecutors reconsider or indict, and in only thirtyfour percent of these cases did prosecutors take that advice. 1 65 In

157.
See Kensatsu shinsa kai h6 [Prosecutorial Review Commission Act], Law
No. 147 of 1948, available at http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi; Howard
Meyers, The Japanese Inquest of Prosecution, 64 HARV. L. REV. 279 (1950); Mark D.
West, Prosecutorial Review Commissions: Japan's Answer to the Problem of
ProsecutorialDiscretion,92 COLUM. L. REV. 684 (1992).
158.

SECRETARY GENERAL SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, SAIBANSHO DE-TA BUKKU

2002 [COURT DATA BOOK 2002 ] 1 (2002) (on file with authors).
Kensatsu shinsa kai h6 [Prosecutorial Review Commission Act], arts. 4, 14,
159.
21.
160.
Kensatsu shinsa kai h [Prosecutorial Review Commission Act], arts. 2(3),
30.
See West, supra note 157, at 695-96.
161.
Kensatsu shinsa kai h5 [Prosecutorial Review Commission Act], art. 27.
162.
163.
See West, supra note 157, at 698-700 (providing statistics on how
infrequently the commissions are used).
Heisei 12 nen ni okeru keiji jiken no gaiky5 05) [General situation of
164.
criminal cases in 2000 (part 1)], 54(2) H6S6 JIJO (2001), at http://www.kantei.go.jp/
jp/singi/sihou/kentoukailsaibanindai2/03.pdf [hereinafter General Situation]. See also
West, supra note 157, at 698-700 (providing comparable figures from the 1980s).
165.
General Situation,supra note 164.
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other words, the Prosecutorial Review Commissions directly effect
less than four cases for every 100,000 non-indictments. Recent highprofile complaints under the scheme brought the Commissions much
needed publicity, but the prosecutor's refusal to act on the
Commission's recommendations has undermined any popular
166
confidence or renewed commitment to the system.
In response to these obvious shortcomings, reformers (including
the JRC) have advocated for more publicity for the system and for a
change to make the Commissions' recommendations binding on
prosecutors. 16 7 Indeed, the Lay Assessor Investigation Committee is
168
also charged with reforming the Prosecutorial Review Commission.
Nonetheless, as with juries, the larger lesson of the Prosecutorial
Review Commission is that no matter how well a system is designed
to promote community involvement, if that system is not used, no
benefits will result.
B. Narrow Lay ParticipationOrgans
The term Narrow Lay Participation Organ is used to refer to
schemes that have roles for specific private individuals with special
skills or qualifications. 169 For example, the Family Court has the
option of designating people of high standing in the community as
Judicial Commissioners (shih6 iin) to provide commonsense advice
and assist with settlements. 170 Typically, individuals involved in
Narrow Lay Participation Organs are nominated and selected from
the community for a term of years based on their high standing in the
community and special knowledge or experience. The lay participants
in the Narrow Lay Participation Organs are not generally given
exclusive decision making power as in Broad Lay Participation
Organs, but they are assisted or accompanied by legal professionals
in exercising their deliberative power. In practical terms, and in
contrast to the broader schemes, this means that there is a lower risk
that Narrow Law Participation Organs will make technical legal

166.
West, supra note 157, at 700 (discussing the Japanese Communist Party
wire-tapping and Boeing-JAL cases from the late 1980s and early 1990s).
167.
JRC Report, supra note 7, at ch. IV, pt. 2(2).
168.
Chairman Masahisa Inouye, Kangaerarerukensatsu shinsa kai seido kaisei
no gaiy6 nitsuite [Regarding the outline on the reform of the prosecutorial review
commission system to consider] (Nov. 11, 2003), at http://www.kantei.go.jp/
jp/singi/sihou/kentoukaisaibanin/dai29/29siryoul.pdf.
169.
There are some similarities between Japan's Narrow Law Participation
Organs and the so-called "blue-ribbon juries" of super-qualified jurors used in the
United States until the late 1960s and early 1970s. See ABRAMSON, supra note 18, at
99-100 (describing the "blue-ribbon juries").
170.
RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO, supra note 34, at 140 n.17.
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errors but a greater risk that they will be unrepresentative of the
general population.
1. Summary Court Judges
Like the Justice of the Peace or magistrate system in England,
lay participation may be injected directly into the judicial process by
using non-lawyer judges. In principle, Japan has followed this option.
To allow for common experience to guide the lowest and highest
courts in Japan, neither Summary Court judges nor Supreme Court
justices are required to be lawyers.
Summary Courts are courts of limited jurisdiction that hear civil
cases with less than V900,000 in controversy and prosecution of1
17
crimes punished by fines or less than fifteen days' imprisonment.
The Summary Court system was based on the English magistrate
system and U.S. small-claims courts. 172 Thus, because the courts are
envisioned to be easily accessible to all citizens, there are 438
Summary Courts throughout Japan and in 2002 there were 806
judges. 173 Unlike judges of the courts of general jurisdiction and
appeal, Summary Court judges are not required to be members of the
bar. 174 Instead, they are only required to pass the general civil
servants' exam and be employed by the court system or justice
ministry for three years. 175 In sharp contrast to Justices of the Peace
in England but similar to magistrates in Australia and small-claims
court judges in the United States, the ranks of Summary Court
judges in Japan have in fact been monopolized by retired members of
the bar and former, lifelong employees of the various judicial
administration organs. 176 In short, far from being private citizens
with common experiences, Summary Court judges in fact are people
who have been ensconced in the legal world for their entire
professional life.
2. Supreme Court Justices
Like Summary Court judges, the requirements for the highest
jurists in the land-Supreme Court justices-were drafted with the

171.
Saibansho h5 [Courts Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 33, available at
http:/law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-binidxsearch.cgi (n.d).
172.
HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 72 (2d ed. 1999).
173.
SECRETARY GENERAL SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, supranote 158, at 1, 16.
174.
Saibansho h5 [Courts Act], arts. 44, 45.
175.
Saibansho h6 [Courts Act], arts. 44(1)(4)-(5), 45.
176.
See ODA, supra note 172, at 72 (citing K. Konno, Kansai no minji jibutsukankatsu kakuch6 [The expansion of jurisdictionof summary courts], in ARUBEKI SHIHO
WO MOTOMETE [IN QUEST OF JUSTICE] 113-14 (Tokyo Bar Assoc. ed., 1983)).
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expectation that one-third of the bench would not be composed of
professional lawyers. The Courts Act specifies that while ten of the
fifteen justices must be selected from among those who have
distinguished themselves as judges, prosecutors, barristers, summary
court judges, or legal academics, the remaining five positions need not
177
be legal specialists.
In practice, however, the court has never been divided among
legal professionals and general citizens of high standing. Instead, it
has been and remains dominated by lawyers. Twelve of the current
fifteen justices are members of the bar: six are former judges, two
were prosecutors, and four were barristers. 178 One is a former legal
academic; another is a former diplomat who has three law degrees
and previously was the government official responsible for
international law. Justice Kazuko Yoko'o, the only woman on the
court, is the only non-lawyer; she graduated with a liberal arts degree
179
and previously worked for the Ministry of Health and Welfare.
Historically as well, lawyers have dominated the top court. Of the 138
justices in the post-War era there were fifty-three judges, forty-five
barristers, fifteen prosecutors, twelve legal academics, six diplomats
(all of whom had a legal education and were charged with
international law responsibilities prior to joining the bench), five
Directors of the Cabinet's Legislation Bureau, and two former
bureaucrats.18 0 The other bureaucrat in addition to Justice Yoko'o
was the only other woman justice, Hisako Takahashi, who worked in
8
the Ministry of Labor.I1
Thus, rather than realize the ideal of a
Supreme Court with two-thirds legal competency and one-third
broad-based expertise, Japan has allowed lawyers and other quasilawyers to capture the highest court much as they have the lower
courts.
3. Conciliators
Regardless of the existence of the court system, most disputes, in
Japan and elsewhere, are not resolved by a judge. Not unlike most

177.
Saibansho h5 [Courts Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 41(1)(1)-(6), available
at http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi (n.d).
178..
Supreme Court, Justices of Japan, at http://courtdomino2.courts.go.jpl
shokaie.nsflView0l?OpenView (last visited Oct. 1, 2003).
179.
Id.
180.
Supreme Court, Saikesai no saibankan no sh5kai [Introduction to
justices of the supreme court], at http://courtdomino2.courts.go.jp/shokaiJ.nsf/
History?OpenPage (last visited Oct. 1, 2003).
181.
Id. By implication, this also raises the important question that if a woman
was desired on the highest court why the appointment had to go outside the traditional
legal branches to find a suitable person. This in turn sends a mixed message to women
who aspire to be lawyers.
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other systems, Japan has a number of official and semi-official
officers who facilitate the settlement process in addition to judges. In
many cases, these roles have been created specifically to inject
common experience into the dispute-resolution process and to avoid
the legalistic nature of formal proceedings. That is, these roles have
been created largely for the same purpose as the lay assessor system.
By number of cases, the chief dispute-resolution mechanism in
Japan is court-sponsored conciliation (ch~tei). 182 Conciliation is a
semi-judicial mediation service employed as an alternative to formal
litigation. It covers civil matters and family matters but not criminal
proceedings. Nevertheless, it is arguable that greater popular
involvement with civil and family conciliation proceedings would at
least partially satisfy the deficiencies driving the demand for lay
involvement in the criminal system (for example, the greater
democratization of society would be accomplished regardless of
whether participation was in civil or criminal matters). Thus,
discussion of the success or failure of lay participation in the
conciliation process is relevant to identifying potential weaknesses in
the proposed lay assessor system.
At the center of the conciliation process are conciliators.
Conciliators are stipend employees of the court system. Two
conciliators and a judge form a conciliation panel that tries to
facilitate private settlement. 183 Conciliators are divided into two
categories: civil-matter conciliators and family-matter conciliators.
These individuals are selected by the relevant District, Family, and
Summary Courts from the local population for their "specialist [i.e.,
non-legal] knowledge and experience" (senmontekina chishiki
84
keiken).
In 2002 there were 13,028 civil conciliators and 12,292 family
conciliators; 5,225 of the total number of conciliators are both civil
and family officers.' 8 5 In comparison, there are 3,094 regular and
Summary Court judges.18 6 Of the civil conciliators, the most common
professions represented are barrister (fifteen percent) and
amalgamated professionals (twenty percent), a category that covers
87
patent attorneys, tax attorneys, CPAs, appraisers, and so forth.'
The largest group of civil conciliators are those who do not note an

In 2001 alone there were 367,404 civil conciliations filed. SECRETARY
182.
GENERAL SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, supranote 158, at 50, 67.
183.
DAN FENNO HENDERSON, CONCILIATION AND JAPANESE LAw 200-04 (1965).
Minji chbtei h6 [Civil Conciliation Act], Law No. 222 of 1951, art. 8,
184.
available at http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi (n.d.); Kaji shinpan h6 [Family
Trial Act], Law No. 152 of 1947, art. 22-2, available at http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgibin/idxsearch.cgi (n.d.).
185.

SECRETARY GENERAL SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, supra note 158, at 17.

186.
187.

Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
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outside occupation (thirty percent), however, these are largely retired
members of the bar and former clerks of the Court and Justice
Ministry. 188 In sum, approximately sixty-five percent of civil
conciliators have a legal background. The same is true for family
conciliators, even though the Family Court tries to have at least one
woman on each conciliation panel-and women are underrepresented in the various legal professions. 189 A representative
survey of family conciliators suggests twenty-six percent are retired
public officials mostly from the court and prison systems, seventeen
percent are retired members of the bar, thirteen percent are
educators (a category that includes many legal academics), and nine
percent are professionals along the lines of patent attorneys. 190 That
sixty-five percent of conciliators have a legal background has led one
researcher to conclude the "occupational backgrounds of the
[conciliators] indicate that they come from among people with higher
social status in local communities."'191 The flip-side of this conclusion
is that conciliators do not inject common experience into the
proceedings because lawyers, retired lawyers, quasi-lawyers, and
other similar professionals have commandeered the common person's
role.
C. Other Lay Organs
There are a plethora of other roles in Japan through which
common or non-legal experience is supposed to be introduced into the
dispute resolution process. 192 These roles have also tended to suffer
from both the failings of the broad and narrow lay organs, namely
marginalization into obscurity and capture by legal experts broadly

188.
Id.
189.
Women comprise twelve percent of the judiciary, between four and ten
percent of the prosecutors, and ten percent of barristers. Id. at 16; JOHNSON, supra
note 23, at 90 n.3; JFBA, Kaiinsa no suii [Change in membership numbers] (2000), at
http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/jp/katsudo/toukei/suii2.html.
190.
Masayuki Murayama, Does a Lawyer Make a Difference? Effects of a
Lawyer on Mediation Outcome in Japan, 13 INT'L J. L., POL'Y & FAM. 52, 57-58 (1999).
191.
Id. at 58.
192.
In addition to the various organs noted below there are Psychiatric Review
Boards (PRB, seishin iry6 shinsa ka). Seishin hoken oyobi seshin shingai sha fukushi
ni kan suru hbritsu [Act Concerning the Welfare of the Mentally Handicapped and
Mentally Protected], Law No.123 of 1950, arts. §§ 13-13, 38, available at http://law.egov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi. The PRB system was created by amendment in 1988 to
monitor and hear complaints from persons involuntarily institutionalized. IAN NEARY,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN 154 (2002). There are five
members of the PRBs, including three doctors, one "person with a background in law,"
and one generalist. Id. Thus, they are Narrow Lay Participation Organs, but
dominated by medical professionals rather than lawyers. Id. at 156. Furthermore, like
the old jury system and the Prosecutorial Review Commissions, resort to the PRBs is
rare, and only 30 cases per year result in release. See id. at 153-57.
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defined. The most notable role of this type is arbitration. Like
conciliation, arbitration is limited to civil and commercial matters,
but if it is functioning to achieve the dual objectives of lay
participation, it could relieve some of the pressure for reform of the
criminal system.
Japan has a variety of organs supporting arbitration. One of the
selling points of arbitration is said to be that it avoids over-legality
and formality by allowing technical experts rather than legal experts
(i.e., judges) to adjudicate. 193 In Japan, however, as with conciliators,
the lay role has been captured by legal professionals and, like juries,
the entire system has been marginalized by lack of use. For example,
the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association's (JCAA) Panel of
Arbitrators list is composed of seventy-six percent members of the
bar, fourteen percent legal academics, and only ten percent from the
business field. Similarly, the association's list of recommended
mediators is eighty-three percent members of the bar, four percent
legal academics, and only thirteen percent from business or other
areas.19 4 Moreover, the JCAA historically has heard far fewer than
ten cases a year.195 Japan's other primary arbitration organization,
the Japan Shipping Exchange, which is limited only to maritime
claims but hears many more cases, is composed of arbitrators
seventy-eight percent of whom are from business and labor
organizations and only twenty-three percent of whom are legal
196
academics or members of the bar.
A number of other in-court and out-of-court opportunities for lay
participation exist in the Japanese justice system. For example, as
noted above, the Summary Courts in Japan may call one of the 6,053
laypersons known as Judicial Commissioners (shiho iin) to give
advice and assist with settlement; 19 7 however, Summary Judges only

193.
See, e.g., International Chamber of Commerce, Advantages of Arbitration,
available at http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/introduction.asp
(last
visited Oct. 1, 2003) (stating that the ICC allows for dispute resolution through the use
of persons who have specialized competence in the relevant field).
194.
Japan Commercial Arbitration Association (JCAA), Panel of Arbitrators
(Jan. 1, 1997) (on file with authors).
195.
See JCAA, Jigy6 h6koku sho [Report on Business] (2002), at
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/introduction.asp (noting that despite
increases in filings only nine cases were resolved in 2002); ODA, supra note 172, at 83
(noting an average of five cases a year in the mid 1990s).
196.
Japan Shipping Exchange, Heisei 14-15 nendo kaiji chasai iinkai chasainin
meibo [List of Arbitrators on the Maritime Arbitration Council 2002-2003] (June 4,
2003), at http://www.jseinc.org/tomac/commission/chusainin.asp.
197.
Minji sosh5 h6 [Code of Civil Procedure], Law No. 109 of 1996, art. 279;
Supreme Court, Shih6 iin seido ni tsuite [Regarding the judicial commissioner system],
at http://courtdomino2.courts.go.jp/4925648aOO553f2a.nsf/0/76248b23ella948449256
caaOO017fb6?OpenDocument&Highlight=0,_v2276i44m8088hjogh3qg_
(last visited
Oct. 1, 2003).
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deem assistance of Judicial Commissioners necessary in around four
percent of all cases. 198 Similarly situated are the 6,038 Family Court
Councillors (san'yo-in); lawyers are the most represented profession
in this group. 199 More ubiquitous but equally obscure are the 49,000
Voluntary Probation Officers (hogo shi) and 14,000 Human Rights
200
Protection Officials (jinken y6go iin).
The JRC identified revitalization of the existing lay participation
roles as a priority, along with the introduction of the lay assessor
system. The efforts to date, however, have not resulted in much
improvement. For example, the test for notary publics (k6sh6'nin) was
revised to encourage lay participation in this highly lucrative area
that has been completely monopolized by retired justice ministry and
court officials.2 0 1 Unfortunately, not a single general applicant passed
the revised exam even though eighty-eight percent of the judicial
20 2
bureaucrats who took the test passed.
Another example of a failed effort is the reform system's main
mechanism for change itself, the Deliberative Councils (shingikai).It
is interesting that the reforms to the Deliberative Council system
have arguably resulted in more legal and less lay representation.
Deliberative Councils historically have played a crucial role in
defining and drafting the government's legislative reform agenda but
have been criticized for being captured by interested parties such as
industry and bureaucracy. 20 3 The recent diversification of the various

198.
General Secretariat, Shih6 tokei nenp6, Minji gyosei hen [Annual Report of
Judicial Statistics, Civil and Administrative Cases], vol. 3, at 33 (Sup. Ct. (Japan)
2002).
199.
Kaji shinpan h5 [Family Trial Act], Law No. 152 of 1947, arts. 3, 10,
available at http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi (n.d.); SECRETARY GENERAL
SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, supra note 158, at 18; Supreme Court, San'yo-in
[Councillors], at http://www.courts.go.jp/kouhou/mado/qanda.html (last visited Oct. 1,
2003) (noting the most common profession is barrister, representing ten percent).
200.
Hogoshi h6 [Probation Officer Act], Law No. 204 of 1950, art. 1, available at
http:/Jlaw.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi;
Jinken y5go iin ho [Human Rights
Protection Officers Act], Law No. 139 of 1949, art. 1, available at http://law.egov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi; Ministry of Justice, Jinken yago iin seido no gaiy6
[Outline of the human rights protection officials system] (Jan. 1, 2001), at
http://www.moj.go.jp/SHINGI/011221/referO4.html; Ministry of Justice, Q&A Hogoshi
[Questions and answers regarding voluntary probation officers] (Jan. 1, 2002), at
http://www.moj.go.jp/HOGO/hogol0.html (noting that voluntary probation officers are
predominantly not lawyers and also that they are not cross-representative as they are
overwhelmingly elderly).
201.
Kbshbnin h5 [Notary Public Act], Law No. 53 of 1909, available at
http:/flaw.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi; WATANABE ET AL., supra note 20, at 133-35
(noting of the almost 600 notary publics appointed by the government more than 500 of
them are former judges, prosecutors, or justice bureaucrats; that their average age is
over sixty-five; and that they are extremely well-compensated).
202.
Laymen Fail Notary Public Test, YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Aug. 11, 2003,
availableat 2003 WL 5139093.
203.
See generally Noble, supra note 39, at 113-33.
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councils, however, which now include over 1,700 national members,
has in very large part resulted in an increase of legal academics and
members of the bar serving in council positions rather than more
popular representatives. 4 Despite this, some gains have been made in
20
female representation.
D. Conclusions RegardingHistoricalLay Participation
Two clear warnings emerge from this assessment of the
historical lay assessor systems in Japan. First, many of the systems,
particularly the Broad Lay Participation Organs, are marginalized by
non-use and obscurity. Second, most of the Narrow Lay Participation
Organs are not injecting any common experience into judicial
proceedings since legal professionals, broadly defined, have captured
most of the places for private citizens. Because of these two
shortcomings, it is not surprising that reformers have perceived the
need for yet another lay participation organ to achieve the goals of
greater public involvement.
The question that remains is whether the proposed lay assessor
system will avoid the pitfalls of all past and present lay participation
organs and be able to deliver better justice and a more democratic
society. As is evident from these past cases, only actual experience
will tell whether the mixed court program will be able to avoid either
obsolescence because of a combination of optional elements and
strategic incentives, or well-intentioned capturing by lawyerwannabes. The pre-enactment design of the program, however, will
make success or failure more likely. Thus, the drafters of the current
proposal have tried to dodge some previous pitfalls. For example, the
proposed scheme is carefully drafted to exclude all quasi-lawyers from
eligibility, thereby ensuring that the role is not captured by the legal
profession. In addition, the drafters have conspicuously ensured that
the system is not optional, which undermined the old jury and the
Prosecutorial Review Commissions systems.
Some of the proposed structural elements, however, might be
used in ways that circumvent the objectives of the scheme. Most
obvious, how the definition of applicable crimes is drawn will affect
the breadth of the reforms' effect. If the narrowest definition is used,
only one percent of the criminal cases that reach the courts will

204.
See Kent Anderson, Comparative Approaches to Continuing Legislative
Reform: Considering Insolvency Law Reform in Japan and Several Common Law
Countries, Law in Asia and Near Future Conference (Nov. 10, 2001), at
http://www.copymart.gr.jp/iiassy/asia.html; Cabinet Office, Gender Equality Bureau,
Kuni no shingikai ni okeru jyosei iin no sankaku jy6ky6 shirabe [Investigation
regardingthe status of women member participation in national deliberative councils]
(Sept. 30 2001), at http://www.gender.go.jp/ratio/010930.html.
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invoke a lay assessor panel. Moreover, this narrow gateway has the
potential to be closed further in practice if prosecutor's offices
modify their charging policy to implicate even fewer cases within
the definition of lay assessable crimes. On the other hand, if the
broadest definition for lay assessment claims is used invoking 6.7
percent of criminal cases and if the prosecutor's offices employ a
liberal charging policy, they have the ability to overload the system
both in cost and time, which will subsequently cause its meltdown.
This power to regulate the flow of cases will reside solely with the
prosecutor's offices, as neither the court nor an accused may decline
a mixed-court trial, even if the defendant confesses. Thus, not only
is the success or failure of the system dependant upon the
prosecutors appropriately regulating the stream of cases, the
prosecutors themselves will face a changing environment where the
pressure to resort to U.S.-style plea bargaining will develop. In
short, as presently designed, support by the prosecutor's office is
205
crucial to its success.
Commitment to the lay assessor ideal by the judiciary is also
essential for the system to deliver the objectives of improved justice
and democratic engagement. The apprehension
about the
marginalization of the lay role by professional judges has been one of
the central concerns for critics and supporters in Japan. 20 6 Thus, it is
surprising that the proposal does not contain any structure or
guidance regarding the procedure for the deliberative phase of the
trial. Indeed, the current set-up-with judges leading a discussion
voted on by a majority of members-seems ripe for abuse. This has
been a problem in other jurisdictions with mixed courts such as
Germany, where judges dominate the deliberations and lay assessors
essentially go along for the ride. 20 7 Further, the German system is
better protected against this abuse than the proposed Japanese
system because German lay assessors are appointed for a number of
years during which they can accumulate enough legal sophistication
to achieve the self-confidence necessary to disagree with a judicial
professional. 20 8 In comparison, the Japanese one-time appointment
system seems particularly susceptible to lay assessors' deference, not
on the basis of age or social status, but rather on legal knowledge and

205.
Given that "the influence of the jury on the conduct of litigation in the
United States goes far beyond the jury trials that actually take place," ABRAMSON,
supra note 18, at 6, one possible result in Japan's case is that the prosecutor's office
will become more willing to "plea bargain" cases around the lay assessor requirement,
something which to date it has opposed. See JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 245-47.
206.
See, e.g., Kodner, supra note 5, at 251.
207.
See id. at 247-48 (collecting and reviewing sources).
208.
Id.
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experience. 20 9 It bears repeating that the warning here is not that the
general Japanese public is incapable or hampered in making
decisions or conclusions contrary to those in power. Indeed, the
seventeen percent acquittal rate for the pre-War jury and the
prosecution requests in high profile cases from the Prosecutorial
Review Commission prove the people's ability. Rather, the caution is
to ensure that those in power are not given the opportunity to
manipulate the system so that it becomes irrelevant because of
obscurity or capture. Sufficient procedural protections of the
deliberation process will help to prevent such manipulation.
The call for a new lay assessor system suggests that the
historical mechanisms for lay participation in the Japanese judicial
system have failed to deliver the dual goals of improved justice and a
greater democratic society. A critical evaluation of these historical lay
participation schemes suggests that they have failed because they
have been marginalized to inconsequence or the layperson's role has
been overtaken by legal experts. Using this lesson as a standard by
which to test the likelihood of the proposed lay assessor scheme for
achieving its ambitious goals suggests that the drafters have avoided
some of the most obvious pitfalls and may be poised for success.
Successful application of the new regime, however, will require the
commitment of the government to fund the project sufficiently, the
prosecutor's office to regulate an appropriate flow of cases, and the
judiciary to strive for meaningful participation by the lay participants
through appropriately structured deliberation procedures. Thus,
contrary to the speculation of many who argue in Orientalist terms
that the largest hurdle for success of the proposal will be overcoming
the public's dependence and deference to authority, as so vividly
shown in Nakahara's film and by the psychological data reviewed
below, history suggests that the common people are the one factor
that may be regarded with confidence. 2 10

209.
See Lempert, Citizen Participation,supra note 5, at 11 (noting that, in
general, "deference by the lay assessors [to professional judges] is natural and seems
regularly to occur," but continuing--erroneously in our opinion-that "[iun Japan,
where deference to age and status is built into the culture more than in most Western
societies, lay assessors would be likely to be even more influenced by professional
judges' opinions than the lay participants in European mixed tribunals").
210.
In this respect, the Japanese experience may prove to be like the U.S. one.
See ABRAMSON, supra note 17, at 5 ("My own experience ... has convinced me that
jurors are smarter than assumed by lawyers ... ").
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V. INTERNATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY CONTEXT

This section shifts the focus from historical and domestic review
of the lay assessor system proposal to a consideration of international
empirical social psychological research. This approach is undertaken
to show the broader context in which the domestic analysis reviewed
above takes place. The data and norms discussed in this portion
derive from studies of small-group decision-making in mixed courts
and all-lay juries conducted in Europe, North America, and Japan.
This analysis is introduced here because continued empirical
investigation of jury systems by psychologists and socio-legal
researchers will be crucial for understanding the role and results of
Japan's lay assessor system and for appropriate planning, evaluation,
and refinement of the system. This section is organized around the
three primary issues in the debate about Japan's lay assessor system:
(1) the numerical composition of the mixed court; (2) the voting rules
to be used; and (3) the resulting relationship between lay and expert
factions. In examining these points using some of the available
international psychological research, the question whether the
proposed lay assessor system can deliver the goals sought by the JRC
must be asked. Although a number of concerns are noted, such as the
majority voting requirement, we conclude that based on the most
recent empirical psychological data, the proposed model fairs well in
creating a system that should improve trial decisions and contribute
to a more democratic society.
A. Numerical Composition of the Mixed Court
As mentioned above in Part III, there are a number of proposals
regarding the composition of the mixed court. These include (1) three
judges and two or three lay assessors, (2) one or two judges and nine
or eleven lay assessors, and (3) three judges and four to six lay
assessors. The last two options mirror the norm in European mixed
juries in which citizens form a numerical majority on the mixed court
in an attempt to balance the potential for judges to gain an influential
status-based majority on the court. 211 Needless to say, each of these
proposed compositions will have different implications when

211.
Y. Ohtsubo et al., How Can Psychology Contribute to Designing a Mixed
Jury System in Japan?:Ongoing Debates and a Thought Experiment, Paper Presented
at the Fourth Conference of the Asian Association of Social Psychology, Melbourne,
Austl. (July 2001), availableat http://www.nara-u.ac.jp/soc/staffs/ohtsubo/english.htm.
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combined with each of the three different proposals for majority
voting rules discussed above.
Empirical evidence seems crucial for making the final decision
about composition. Ohtsubo, Fujita, and Kameda (2001) conducted a
relevant computer simulation that modeled the likely effect of
different numerical compositions of a mixed court on final-verdict
guilty rates. 212 This approach was based on Davis' (1973) Social
Decision Scheme (SDS) modeling approach 213 that uses the
distribution of initial individual verdict preferences to predict the
likelihood that a jury will return a particular final verdict. This
modeling cannot, of course, predict the precise decision making
dynamics of real deliberating juries; however, similar methodology
has been elaborated for analysis of the progression of actual
deliberations from initial verdict preferences to final collective
decision. 214 In the Ohtsubo et al. (2001) simulation, the researchers
used status-based weightings in a weighted majority process model 2 15
to reflect the assumed power and status differentials existing
between the lay and expert factions within a mixed court. Modeling
was done on a variety of panel combinations and with varying levels
of initial agreement between panel members entered as inputs into
the simulation.
The results of the modeling were surprising. The modelers found
that increasing the size of the lay assessor faction does not
straightforwardly 216 increase the influence of the lay assessor
faction. 217 Specific examples of modeled courts composed of three
judges and six, nine, or twelve lay assessors were highlighted as
examples (only the three judge and six lay assessor model closely
resemble the actual JRC proposals, but all of the information is
nonetheless insightful). Under different model settings corresponding
to the assumed influence of the judge's initial verdict preferences, it
was found that increasing the size of the citizen faction from six to
nine to twelve lay assessors in deliberation with three judges resulted
in somewhat unexpected patterns of final verdict guilty rates.
Three examples of the complex patterns of guilty rates obtained
under the different assumed conditions were as follows. First, guilty

212.
Id.
213.
James H. Davis, Group Decision and Social Interaction:A Theory of Social
Decision Schemes, 80 PSYCHOL. REV. 97, 97-125 (1973).
214.
See Garold Stasser & James H. Davis, Group Decision Making and Social
Influence: A Social Interaction Sequence Model, 88 PSYCHOL. REV. 523, 523-51 (1981).

215.
Erich Kirchler & James H. Davis, The Influence of Member Status
Differences and Task Type on Group Consensus and Member Position Change, 51 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 83, 83-91 (1986).

216.
We use "straightforwardly" to mean positively and monotonically.
217.
We use "influence of the lay assessor faction" to mean operationalized as a
not-guilty judgment tendency.
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rates were unaffected by increasing the size of the lay assessor faction
from nine to twelve when judicial influence was set low and moderate
initial disagreement was assumed. This was true despite a detectable
change in attitude among lay assessors toward greater leniency by
having six instead of nine lay assessors under these conditions.
Second, a leniency influence proportional to an increase of the
number of lay assessors (six to nine to twelve) was obtained when
judicial influence was given a low rating and initial disagreement was
set at a more acute level. Third, guilty rates were affected by lay
assessors' more lenient judgment tendencies only following increases
from a lay faction size of nine to twelve under conditions of high
judicial decision making power and moderate or acute initial
disagreement. The authors concluded from these results that
increasing the number of lay assessors alone is clearly not the way to
avoid undesirable levels of judicial dominance under all conditions.
From this simulation it is clear that the effect of the mixed
court's composition will be altered by the level of initial disagreement
(which may be chiefly uncontrollable and related to the facts of each
case) and the differential impact of the judge and lay assessor
factions. Differential impact may be inherent in the group relations
created by mixed court procedures such as the majority voting rule
chosen from Options A, B, and C outlined above. Notably, Options B
(at least one judge and one lay assessor in the majority that convicts)
and C (a majority of judges and at least one assessor for convictions)
suggest that differential levels of decision support be required from
within each of the factions. The precise effect of each proposed voting
rule and composition has not been modeled as yet, although this is
possible if the model settings used by Ohtsubo et al. (2001) can be
adjusted to adequately capture the structural effect of the
combination of proposed voting rule and court composition. This could
be done by adding new rules to the models, adjusting the judgment
tendencies, altering assumptions about the relative initial agreement
level, and adjusting the assumed decision making power or influence
weightings of each faction. It may be more difficult, however, to model
accurately voting options B and C, especially because they imply
different decision rules based on the type of case outcome (conviction
versus acquittal). If these conditional rules can be translated into
rates of likely initial verdict agreement between factions and/or
relative decision making power of each faction, then SDS modeling
may provide some useful estimates of each proposal's likely effect on
guilty verdict rates. Ohtsubo et al. (2001) rightly conclude that
without greater accuracy in the specification relevant parameters and
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systemic goals, the SDS modeling approach cannot produce a
218
recommended optimal numerical composition.
Of interest is the fact that Ohtsubo et al. (2001) claim to be
searching for the optimal ratio of lay citizens to expert judges that
would result in equality of decision making power. This statement
raises important issues. Is the achievement of equal decision making
power on a mixed court an appropriate goal? Would a better goal be to
strike an appropriate balance between different types of expert and
lay influence such that the citizens and judges maintain distinct but
perhaps complementary decision making roles within an appropriate
deliberation environment? This is different from seeking equal
influence for both factions on all matters. 219 Ohtsubo et al. (2001)
admit, as a justification for their status-weighting assumption, 220 that
judges and jurors will have different judgment tendencies. They make
the interesting comment that if these judgment tendencies did not
differ between judges and lay assessors, there would be little point in
introducing lay participation in criminal trials since lay participation
would add little to the process of adjudication by the judge alone.
Furthermore, these researchers remain concerned that not all
results from Western empirical research on juries are applicable to
the Japanese proposals. Their modified (weighted majority process)
SDS models do not allow them to investigate the effect of possible
cultural variables on deliberations. Therefore, more subtle evaluation
tools will be needed to investigate the specific deliberation dynamics
observed in Japanese mixed court deliberations and to reveal how to
best manage the mutual influence of each faction upon outcome
variables other than guilty verdict rates. From this research, it
appears that achieving better justice and democracy via the mixed
court composition requires further investigation. This is especially
warranted because intuitive predictions based on increasing the size
of the lay faction to achieve equality of decision making power may
not directly achieve, or be the only way to achieve, the desired goals
of the lay assessor system.

218.
It is worth noting that systemic goals assumed by Ohtsubo et al. were a
tradeoff between judicial dominance and lay assessor faction size. See supra note 211
and accompanying text.
219.
See infra note 225 and accompanying text (discussing the difference
between intellective and judgmental tasks as well as between expert influence and
mere coercion).
220.
That is, the assigning of higher guilty decision rates for judges than lay
assessors within the model.
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B. Voting Rules
The Investigation Committee proposed three options for voting
rules, although all contemplate a majority rather than a unanimous
decision. Martin, Kaplan, and Alamo (2003)221 claim that results from
all-citizen jury research suggest that deliberations resulting in
unanimity and deliberations resulting in a majority verdict can be
remarkably similar in nature. Despite this suggestion, they do note
that requiring unanimity tends to produce more hung juries. Also,
jurors in these deliberations perceive the decision making process to
be more satisfactory, more thorough, and fairer. Unanimous decision
rules also seem to produce greater juror confidence in the collective
2 22
verdicts than majority verdict rules.
The fact that different decision rules produce different subjective
perceptions is important in the context of managing group relations
on a mixed court. Despite their drawback, unanimous voting
requirements on mixed panels may avoid creating additional group
tensions between expert and lay factions. Unanimity may also be a
procedurally simpler option than adopting one of the three more
complex majority verdict options already proposed. These majorityverdict options may reinforce status-based and expertise-based group
differences inherent in mixed courts and lead to negative perceptions
of process when dissenters' views can be effectively ignored. To the
extent that the proposed rules may minimize the perceived relative
importance of lay assessors' votes, any form of majority voting rules
could be psychologically dangerous.
Furthermore, implementing procedures for judgment writing
under the proposed majority-voting rules could be problematic.
Procedural injustice may also be perceived by dissenters whose views
are not included formally in the court's record. Whether this would
decrease public enthusiasm about lay participation or on public
perceptions of the legitimacy of the mixed court's work is yet to be
seen. It would seem more sensible, however, for the mixed court to
adopt voting procedures that encourage consensual judgments rather
than requiring them to justify majority decisions (especially majority
convictions) to the members of the mixed courts themselves or to the
public at large. There may be psychological benefit in adopting
unanimous decision rules that assume that the mixed court, although
diversely constituted, could possibly reach consensus.

221.
Ana M. Martin et al., Discussion Content and Perception of Deliberation in
Western European Versus American Juries,9(3) PSYCHOL., CRIME & LAW 247, 249 (2003).
222.
Id. See C. Nemeth, Interactions between Jurors as a Function of Majority
vs. Unanimity Decision Rules, 7(1) J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 38, 54-56 (1977).
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Nemeth and colleagues argue that unanimity rules increase the
quality of the decision making process and the psychological rigor of
deliberations. 223 These researchers have observed that those holding
minority positions in decision making groups can become useful
devil's advocates who stimulate both the quality and quantity of
arguments used during deliberations. Nemeth suggests that these
benefits justify not only extra time and expense of deliberating to
unanimity but also the associated higher risk of creating hung juries.
Needless to say, a procedure for resolving hung juries is required if
unanimous decision rules are adopted, especially if majority verdicts
are not allowed after several unsuccessful attempts to reach
unanimity are made by the mixed court. With majority voting rules,
this procedural complexity is avoided but perhaps at a psychological
cost. Keeping in mind these strong recommendations for unanimous
verdicts in the interest of better justice and more democracy, it is
interesting to note that most of the European mixed juries use a non2 24
unanimous decision rule.
C. The Relationship Between Lay and Expert Factions
It is perhaps trite to suggest that judges will exert status-based
influence over lay assessors, and a number of studies suggest that
deference by lay assessors tends to occur in mixed courts. 225 What is
more interesting from a psychological perspective is knowing when
and how both professional judges and lay citizens may influence each
other during mixed court deliberations. This more subtle
understanding of the dynamics of mutual influence across a status
boundary is needed if the common tensions and benefits arising from
conflict and cooperation within mixed courts are to be anticipated.

223.
C.J. Nemeth, Dissent, Diversity and Juries,in SOCIAL INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL
REALITY: PROMOTING INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE 23 (F. Butera & G. Mugny eds.,
2001). See generally C.J. Nemeth et al., Devil's Advocate Versus Authentic Dissent:
Stimulating Quantity and Quality, 31(6) EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 707, 707-20 (2001).
224.
Martin et al., supra note 221, at 247.
225.
See, e.g., R. Arce et al., Empirical Assessment of the Escabinado Jury
System, 2 PSYCHOL., CRIME & LAw 175 (1996) (showing post-deliberation verdict
change toward the judge's verdict by lay assessors observed in mock trial deliberations
with one professional judge and five lay assessors). See also Alfonso Palmer,
Experimental Study of the Effects of Juror Composition, 18 BOLETIN DE PSICOLOGIA 49

(1988), cited in Ana M. Martin et al., Discussion Content and Perceptionof Deliberation
in Western European Versus American Juries, 9(3) PSYCHOL., CRIME & LAW 247 (2003)

(noting the greater change of initial verdicts within mixed juries during deliberations
by lay assessors but not by the expert judges).
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1. Effect on Verdict and Perceptions of Experience
Research on the functioning of mixed courts is a relatively small
part of jury literature, but some recent work provides a more detailed
understanding of mutual influence processes and mutual perceptions
within deliberating mixed courts. Martin, Kaplan, and Alamo (2003)
provide a recent review of important European research on mixed
juries. Their review reaches back to work by Brandstatter,
Bleckwenn, and Kette (1984), who investigated the decision making
process of mixed industrial tribunals in the then Federal Republic of
Germany. 226 In these tribunals, composed of two lay assessors and
one professional judge, lay assessors attributed more "expert power"
to the professional judge rather than to the fellow lay assessor. Most
of the lay judges interviewed perceived status differences to exist and
deference to occur because of the task-relevant knowledge and
decision making expertise of the professional judge.
This result could be simply interpreted as coercion-an exercise
of the greater social power of judges on a mixed tribunal. But it could
also be interpreted as understandable deference of lay assessors to
professional judges. This deference might result because judges are
perceived to be professionals who can provide highly beneficial, taskrelevant expertise crucial for completing the collective decision
making task within a task-focused group.
To understand the nature of this influence better, Kaplan and
Martin (1999) 227 and Martin et al. (2003) examined and directly
measured the type of influence perceived to be mutually exerted by
lay and expert factions within mixed courts discussing their verdict
and sentencing decisions. The researchers also measured lay
assessors' subjective reactions to the influence exerted within mixed
court deliberations. In Kaplan and Martin's (1999) study, two mock
expert judges and three mock lay assessors deliberated in one of two
types of cases involving mock violations of a university's behavioral
code. 228 The first type of case utilizes "intellective" processing,
involving mainly fact finding and determination of the truth of
witnesses' evidence. The second type of case, a "judgmental case,"

226.
Hermann Brandstaitter et al., Decision-making of Industrial Tribunals as
Described by Professional and Lay Judges, 33 INT'L REV. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 137,
137 (1984), cited in Ana M. Martin et al., Discussion Content and Perception of
Deliberation in Western European Versus American Juries, 9(3) PSYCHOL., CRIME &
LAW 247 (2003).
227.
Martin F. Kaplan & Ann Martin, Effects of Differential Status of Group
Members on Process and Outcome of Deliberation, 2 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP
RELATIONS 347 (1999).
228.
Id. at 348.
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involves mainly judgment calls and evaluative decision making
appeals
to
normative
consensus
about
requiring
more
blameworthiness and the application of discretionary legal tests.
Kaplan and Martin (1999) found that the expert judges (trained
law students) influenced their mixed courts more when the case was
judgmental rather than intellective. The experts were also more
active and engaged discussants in judgmental cases. It is interesting
that lay assessors in these mock deliberations were more influential
than experts in intellective as opposed to judgmental cases. These
results suggest that different factional members on a mixed court can
have a different, and perhaps complementary, influential effect on
each other during different types of decision making tasks that may
arise.
Martin, Kaplan, and Alamo (2003) conducted further research
using a similar experimental design where intellective and
judgmental case deliberations occurred concerning breaches of a
university's behavioral code. These deliberations between expert or
legally trained assessors (law students) and lay assessors (psychology
students) were also compared to deliberations of all-lay juries.
Results tend to support the general findings of Kaplan and
Martin (1999), although, at times, the data are not as clear or as
strong as in the earlier study. Expert judges were more active
discussants in judgmental cases than in intellective cases. They were
also observed to exert more normative influence than informational
influence in discussions about both verdict and sentence. In
deliberations over penalty, the experts were rated as making more
normative statements than lay assessors in judgmental cases and
more normative justifications of penalties in intellective cases.
The distinction between "informational" and "normative"
influence is somewhat controversial within social psychology and
relates to the dichotomy outlined by Deutsch and Gerard (1955)229
and others since them. Social and legal psychologists typically fear
"normative influence" insofar as it is a form of coercive status-based
or identity-based pressure exerted to persuade someone about which
social values and behaviors are appropriate in context. It is
considered less pure and more illegitimate than influence caused by
assessment of the quality of information and the logic or strength of
the evidence alone ("informational influence").
Of interest is the fact that post-deliberation reflections from
mixed court members in a study of Martin et al. (2003) differed across
the experimental design, even though verdict choices did not differ

229.
See Morton Deutsch & Harold Gerard, A Study of Normative and
InformationalSocial Influences upon Individual Judgements, 51 J. ABNORMAL & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 629, 629 (1955).
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among various types of mixed courts or types of cases. In general, lay
jurors reported greater participation in intellective cases where they,
although not the experts in these cases, perceived that more factual
issues were discussed. Lay assessors also suggested that they were
influenced more by experts in judgmental cases, 230 which they rated
as involving more deliberative tension than in intellective cases.
It is important to note that when asked to rate the basis of the
power exerted by experts in both judgmental cases and intellective
cases, lay assessors suggested that the basis of experts' influence was
"relevant knowledge regarding the task" rather than any other
possible basis for normative influence (to coerce, to receive reward,
etc.). 23 1 In this sense, the lay assessors were suggesting again, as they
perhaps did in Brandstdtter et al. (1984), that this form of influence
was respected and perceived to be legitimate, beneficial, and crucial
to the success of the collective decision making goal of the mixed
court. Relevant to this finding was that mixed juries made more
statements about legal rules than all-lay juries did. Martin et al.
(2003) concluded that if lay assessors perceived these contributions of
experts as truly relevant expertise, rather than a form of unjustified
status-based coercion, then lay assessors welcomed this deference,
seeing it "more as advice and help than coercion. '2 32 This seems likely
in light of the results from this study that suggest lay assessors
perceived themselves to exert greater informational influence in
intellective cases. This meant that during at least some of these
deliberations, lay assessors did not perceive that they were always
deferring to the experts on the mixed court but rather had their own
domain of expertise and exerted influence on those issues.
Attempting to replicate these findings on actual mixed courts, or with
real judges participating in mock trials, seems valuable.
From these studies it appears that deference to expert judges on
task-relevant dimensions can occur in mixed juries and that lay
assessors do not always find this form of influence detrimental.
Anticipating the Martin et al. (2003) conclusions, Ohtsubo et al.
(2001) suggested that perhaps mixed court deliberation "calls for
informational influence from both judges and lay jurors regarding
different matters, and equal shares of normative influence. ' 233 The
thrust of this statement-that each faction in mixed juries is
influential at different times and for different reasons-appears true

230.
This is as indexed by lay assessor perceptions that experts exerted greater
pressure to get to agreement and for others to withhold their opinions, and that the
experts seemed less convinced by others and influenced others more.
231.
J.R.P. French & B. Raven, The Bases of Social Power, in STUDIES IN SOCIAL
POWER 150, 150-67 (D. Cartwright ed., 1959) (deriving options).
232.
Martin et al., supra note 221, at 261.
233.
Ohtsubo et al., supra note 211, at 20.
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from Kaplan and Martin's (1999) data and from the Martin et al.
(2003) study. These data suggest that mutual influence may be
possible across any status boundary created on mixed courts and that
perhaps the "high status" judges can be influenced by the "low status"
lay assessors at least some of the time.
In light of these data it may be theoretically important to stress
that a combinationof normative and informational social influences may
typically be used by any person attempting to persuade. Therefore,
rather than labelling influence only as "informational" or "normative,"
influence in contexts such as mixed courts may be better expressed as
"referent informational influence. '234 Turner and colleagues prefer this
term because it better captures the simultaneous relevance of both social
identities and perceived informational integrity in attempts to influence
in decision making contexts, especially those structured by a desire to
use a prototypical style of reasoning for the task at hand or as a way of
using a prototypical style of reasoning condoned by fellow members of a
shared decision making group. 2 35 This terminology allows us to better
suggest that some expert influence of lay citizens by professional judges
in mixed courts falls far short of a petty tyrannical exercise of undue
coercion, social pressure, and pure normative influence.
Therefore, Turner's theory of referent informational influence
suggests that in a Japanese mixed court with a conscientious career
judge, it will be considered appropriate for lay assessors to seek
actively the guidance of experts and to incorporate the benefit of this
wisdom and experience into the resulting collective decision making.
In other words, citizens may respect and exploit the legal knowledge
of experts during mixed deliberations, especially on judgmental
cognitive tasks such as those involving application of the law to found
facts, or the clarification of the precise legal issue or the use of a
particular legal test. In many ways, this interpretation of influence
within the mixed court deliberations suggests there may be more
psychological support for the deliberating lay assessor than is often
found in many all-citizen juries. Results from Kaplan and Martin
(1999) in particular suggest that lay assessors are naturally drawn to
intellective (fact finding) tasks and can be quite influential (because
of their status and the quality of their arguments) in collective
discussions about factual interpretations, even though they need to be

234.

See generally JOHN C. TURNER, SOCIAL INFLUENCE 34-47 (Tony Manstead

ed., 1991).
235.
John C. Turner et al., Referent Informational Influence and Group
Polarization,28(2) BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 135, 137-47 (1989).

See also K. Sugimoto,

Group PolarizationPhenomenon in Relation to the Process of Referent Informational
Influence, 40(2) JAPANESE J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 137 (2001) (demonstrating
these processes in the Japanese context).
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influenced at times by legal experts more experienced in the
challenge of judgmental tasks.
The benefit of these complementary roles would be amplified if
positive evaluations of the mixed court experience and the factional
relationship are obtained from lay assessors in evaluations of the lay
assessor system. Such positive evaluations have been obtained from
lay citizens in some mock trial work conducted in Japan by Masahiro
Fujita. This program of mock mixed court trial work is ongoing and is
a highly relevant source of psychological evidence about the
procedural benefits and disadvantages of mixed courts in Japan.
Although the exact psychology of mutual influence processes has not
been analysed in this research, as in the mock mixed court research
discussed above, positive subjective reports have been recorded from
mock Japanese lay assessors, and these bode well for the proposed
system.
In one completed study,236 Fujita empanelled 198 eligible citizens
and twenty-nine judges or attorneys from Osaka. This sample was
split into twenty-three mixed courts that deliberated on a fictitious
case. The mock lay assessors gave post-deliberation reports
suggesting that they were more optimistic about the mixed court
experience after they had deliberated their case than they had been
before the deliberation. This experience made mock lay assessors
more confident that in any future mixed court deliberation they
would be able to express freely their personal views. If this
socialization effect were to occur as a result of lay participation in
Japan's new jury system, the JRC and other supporters of the
reforms would be advancing both goals of better justice and a more
democratic society. Also important, Fujita took explicit measures of
collectivistic orientation2 3 7 (a factor said to prevent active deliberation
and increase deference to people of higher status) and social power
cognition 238 (a measure of the extent to which a person is likely to
defer to higher status of others). Neither of these measures adversely
affected expectations and subjective reports of the mock lay assessors.
Also, neither of these measures affected the weight that the mock lay
assessors afforded to the views of experts during deliberations. These
results suggest, preliminarily, that more democracy can be achieved

236.
Masahiro Fujita, Can Japanese Citizens Play Active Roles in "Saiban-in
Seido'? [Japanese New Mixed Jury System]. Survey Research with Mock Mixed Juries,
Poster Presented at the Psychology & Law International, Interdisciplinary Conference,
Edinburgh (July 7-12, 2003).

237.
See Susumu Yamaguchi, Collectivism amongst the Japanese:A Perspective
from the Self, in INDIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM: THEORY, METHOD AND
APPLICATIONS (U. Kim et al. eds., 1994).
238.
Y. Imai, The Relationship between Perceived Social Power and the
Perception of Being Influenced, 31(3) JAPANESE PSYCHOL. RESEARCH 97 (1989).
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with mixed courts. If the relationship between factions works this
well in practice, there seems to be little reason to assume that
democracy and better justice via mixed courts is impossible to achieve
in Japan.
2. Japanese Deference, Social Identity, and Collectivism
The results from Fujita's mock trial research are useful to keep
in mind as this section briefly considers some cultural arguments
commonly raised against the proposed mixed court deliberations in
Japan. First, it is worth noting that all jury reformers in all countries
face the difficult task of selecting the most appropriate jury trial
procedure for their socio-legal culture. If the procedural choices are
aptly made, then it is likely that the implementing government,
parties to legal proceedings, the legal profession, the decision makers,
and society as a whole will be protected from negative unintended
consequences. The importance of making evidence-based procedural
choices is paramount regardless of whether the proposed reforms
constitute refinement of an all-lay jury system 23 9 or an existing mixed
court system, or whether reformers are suggesting the introduction of
a new type of jury trial not previously used in that country (as is the
case with the mixed court proposal in Japan).
Unfortunately, some criticisms of the JRC proposal have been
based chiefly upon cultural arguments that at times appear to be
gross stereotypes about Japanese psychology. One of the most
common cultural arguments used against the lay assessor model is
that most Japanese citizens will simply and routinely defer to the
views of their high-status superiors (the judges) on a mixed court.
The argument is that if the Japanese automatically defer to judges in
this context, this reaction alone will eliminate any possible benefit of
lay participation in justice. Unquestioning deference to authority will
render the presence of the lay assessors on a mixed court redundant
because of the lack of active participation, influence, and effect that
the lay jury member's views will have upon the verdict and
sentencing decisions made.
This skepticism voiced about proposed Japanese lay
participation in justice but not, say, about German or French lay
participation, seems to flow from a simplistic form of cross-cultural
psychology. This approach simply suggests that all Western citizens
are individualistic in social-value orientation and are robustly critical

239.

See New Zealand Law Commission, Juries in Criminal Trials, Report No.

69 (2001), at http://www.lawcom.govt.nz (reviewing refinement currently being done in

New Zealand based on extensive empirical research).
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of authority. In contrast, Japanese citizens are said to be collectivist
and psychologically dependent on authority.
We suggest that this simplistic approach deserves revision in
light of recent research findings and conceptual understandings of
Japanese collectivism. Also, the approach should be re-evaluated in
light of the fact that the proposed legal reforms explicitly aim to
socialize citizens toward a more active use of the legal system and a
reduction of unquestioning deference. The simplistic belief that
Japanese citizens will always defer to authority explicitly motivated
K~ji Sat5 and the JRC to propose broad reforms of the existing legal
system and legal education. 240 In many ways, the JRC was very
aware of the prevalence of this cultural criticism and believed that it
was a cultural characteristic that, if true, could be changed through
reform and leadership. The approach of Sat6 and his colleagues, then,
assumes that Japanese culture and psychology is fluid and can
change over time in response to external demands and legal reform.
Those more pessimistic than the JRC may underestimate the
potential for Japanese cultural and psychological change. The JRC
and some other government officials seem to be placing their faith in
the Japanese psyche and its potential for change where needed.
241
of
Japan is not alone in having to consider cultural consequences
the operation of any implemented jury system. Like other countries,
they must accept the obligation to monitor constantly the
performance of their jury system.
We encourage skeptics to revise the rather simplistic crosscultural assumption of automatic deference. Some academic
commentators2 42 have relied problematically on dated attitudes about
the Japanese psyche and social structure based on analyses from the
War World II era. 243 Japanese group relations and societal structure
must be considered in light of more recent Japanese social
psychological research into the nature of Japanese self-identity, group
relations, and collectivism. 244 Just as Fujita's work reviewed above
begins to challenge the cultural skeptics' claim, more recent work by
social psychologists such as Toshio Yamagishi, Masaki Yuki, and

240.
See Lawson & Thornley, supra note 27 (providing SatS's arguments).
241.
Martin et al., supra note 220, at 262 (recommending that more cultural
variables be considered in the general research work conducted on mixed courts).
242.
WORLD JURY SYSTEMS, supra note 31, at 353 (citing LESTER W. KISS,
REVIVING THE CRIMINAL JURY IN JAPAN).
243.
See, e.g., RUTH BENEDICT,
PATTERNS OF JAPANESE CULTURE (1946).
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CHRYSANTHEMUM
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SWORD:

244.
See T. Yamagishi et al., Collectivism and In-group Bias, 1(3) ASIAN J. Soc.
PSYCHOL. 315 (1998) (providing explanations of (network) collectivism); M. Yuki,
Intergroups Comparison Versus IntragroupRelations: A Cross-CulturalExaminationof
Social Identity Theory in North American and East Asian Cultural Contexts, 66(2) SOC.
PSYCHOL. Q. 166, 166 (2003).
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colleagues has helped to elaborate understandings of Japanese
collectivism. For example, Yamagishi and colleagues' theory of
"network collectivism" suggests that a complex balance is struck in
the Japanese psyche between socio-relational concerns and individual
cognitive traits. Further, Yuki has recently shown that although
group homogeneity seems to predict group loyalty and harmonious
group relations in the United States, Japanese collective behavior
and group relations often result from individual perceptions of the
relational structure of the group, of individual differences within the
group, and interpersonal connectedness between group members.
These understandings may help to evaluate critically the claims of
automatic deference to authority figures as a cultural bar to adequate
participation of lay assessors on Japanese mixed courts. In some
sense, Yuki's work may suggest that the precise interpersonal and
intragroup relations on each Japanese mixed panel as constituted
may be more important for predicting active deliberation than can
otherwise be predicted by the less subtle claim of universal deference
to authority.
D. Optimistic ConclusionsAbout Psychological Concerns
Our brief review of the psychological literature does not provide
all the answers that Japanese reformers are seeking. Ground for
optimism exists that the proposed system can at least partially
achieve the JRC's goals of better justice and more democracy.
Perhaps aspects of the proposed system simply need to be
implemented before realistic evaluation of the actual procedures (or a
pilot scheme) can be made. Further mock trial research or modeling
studies may also be beneficial. In order to promote research, the
Japanese government can choose to make any newly implemented
system accessible to research by social psychologists who are able to
evaluate the social psychological effect of the chosen procedures. The
reality of this access is questionable because recent reports of
24 5
proposed jury secrecy laws are not encouraging.
From the analysis of the available psychological research it can
be concluded that current proposals about composition are yet to be
adequately tested, especially in terms of the effect that the proposed
majority voting rules may have on deliberation dynamics. The
simplistic notions of automatic deference to authority for either
status-based
or cultural reasons seem to be inaccurate
understandings of the likely psychological dynamics that will be
created on future Japanese mixed courts. Managing the subjective
experience of both lay assessors and judges on mixed courts seems to

245.

See Reform Panel Eyes 4 to 6 Lay Judges, supra note 76.
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be a challenge that is not unique to Japan, or even more difficult to
achieve in Japan. More research is needed on these and other points
to continue the fruitful emerging lines of research and sensitive
methodologies currently available. Continuing this research agenda
will not only benefit the implementation and refinement of the
Japanese system, but it can provide insights to the users of mixed
tribunals internationally.
Given these concerns, speculation about whether any benefit of
the proposed lay participation would be less than that typically
achieved in European countries could be made. Perhaps more
revealing, however, is why critics of the proposed Japanese reforms
have been so hasty to build criticisms upon assumptions about
Japanese psychology when such cultural assumptions were not
similar to the initial concerns about the use of mixed courts in
European countries. If it is appropriate to consider culture-specific
psychology to achieve legal reform, it is surely important that that
psychology aptly describe the prevailing culture and its diversity. If
not, a form of rather insensitive reform and ill-placed skepticism
about legal and social reform may be thrust upon Japan. This could
stymie useful reform by allowing relevant research to be regrettably
ignored and overshadowed by intuitive, habitual, and inapplicable
cultural assumptions.

VI. CONCLUSION

The lay assessor proposal is intended to improve Japanese
justice and Japanese democratic participation. This examination of
the reform from the domestic historical and international
psychological contexts serves an important function in informing
observers, inspiring foreign initiatives and research directions, and
contributing to the debate. Before the lay assessor system can be
conclusively critiqued, a number of important final decisions about
procedure still need to be made. As a result of these analyses,
however, optimism about the initiative is well-based. In summary,
more attention should be paid to justification of the mixed court's
composition, choice of voting rules, delineation of eligible cases, and
provision of appeal rights so as to create the most workable and
ideologically satisfactory solution. A system that provides better
justice and more democracy would also need to minimize judicial
dominance or coercion in deliberations (which may not be as strong as
assumed in all cases), acknowledge the complementary deliberative
roles of judges as well as lay assessors, and avoid effective exclusion
of lay assessors that leads to capture of the institution by elites such
as expert judges and the prosecutor's office. Adoption of unanimous
voting rules on the mixed court may be one way of achieving these
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goals. Determining the effect of any interaction between voting rules
and court composition is important and could be determined by
further analysis.
Well-chosen procedures can help to achieve better justice and
more democracy. This is true even if it is difficult to assess the effect
of the new system on efficiency and cost control in the early years of
the system. The historical review provided in this Article is useful for
investigating the ability of the proposed system to achieve these goals
for two reasons. First, it highlights structural factors that led to the
decline in popularity of the first jury system used in Japan; second, it
emphasizes the extent to which other available avenues for lay
participation in Japan have become captured by legal or political
elites.
There are a number of comparative law issues that will arise
from the eventual passage of the Japanese lay assessor system that
warrant future detailed investigation. For example, it will be
important to test whether the Japanese system of selecting lay
assessors at random from eligible voters avoids the problem of
capture by elites. A comparison with European experience may also
shed light on whether active lay participation is better produced by
Japan's proposed single trial term or by the European model of mixed
court tenure for a number of years. Other comparisons between the
procedure of European and the Japanese mixed courts could be made
to further understanding of which mixed court procedures best
achieve particular goals.
Monitoring of the Japanese mixed court experience will also be
informative to countries such as Australia and the United Kingdom,
where jury trials are waning as the sole form of lay participation in
justice. Countries that use quasi-judicial mixed tribunals for
administrative and specialized adjudication and decision making
(e.g., mental health tribunals, social security review tribunals,
probation and parole panels etc.) will benefit from more research on
the psychological processes operating upon citizens and legal or other
professionals. Even for countries dedicated to jury trials such as the
United States, the Japanese case will provide important comparative
data on issues such as the importance of unanimity versus majority
voting rules, the effectiveness of small-group legal decision making,
and the effect of expert or other forms of influence upon the decision
making of lay citizens on mixed courts. It is hoped that these
dynamics, when viewed in a comparative context, will also contribute
to a better understanding of Japanese law and psychology by further
questioning the use of cultural assumptions such as Japanese
passivity, dependence, consensus, and deference to authority. Such
comparisons all demand future research effort.
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VII. ADDENDUM
On May 21, 2004, the Japanese Diet passed an act creating a lay
assessor system. 246 Passage was made possible following a compromise
by the parties of the Coalition government on January 26, 2004.247 The
new Komeito party had advocated the lawyers' position of a large lay
contingent of seven people with two professional judges, while the
Liberal Democratic Party had pursued the bureaucracy's position of only
four lay representatives and three judges. 248 The compromise was built
on a two-track approach that would allow for smaller mixed courts in
uncontested cases and larger mixed courts when the defendant
challenges the allegations.
The key features of the new law include the following. First, in
contested cases the panel will be composed of six lay members and
three professional judges. 249 For cases in which the defendant has
confessed or does not dispute the charges, the panel will be made up
of four lay persons and one professional judge. 250 In both events, the
panel will determine the verdict and sentence by a simple majority of
all members, although at least one layperson and one judge must
consent to the majority. 25 1 The proceeding will apply to defendants
accused of crimes where the maximum penalty is death or indefinite
imprisonment with hard labor, or where the victim dies because of an
intentional criminal act.2 52 Lay participants will be selected by lot
from voter rolls; this effectively places the age minimum at twenty
years of age. The law does not include a new appeal procedure; thus,
the standard k~so appeal in which three appellate judges will be able
to hear the issues of facts, as well as law, will continue. Finally, the
law provides that the procedure will come into force "within five years
of its publication"-viz., by May 2009.253 Needless to say, these
determinations leave many questions unanswered and much area for
future research.
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